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I. INTRODUCTION 
Father Saturnino Lohure, a Southern Sudanese politician, stated in a speech 
delivered before the Sudanese national Parliament in Khartoum on June 23, 
1958: 
Mr. President, Sir, the South has no ill-intentions whatsoever towards the 
North, the South simply claims to run its local affairs in a united Sudan. 
The South has no intention of separating from the North, for had that 
been the case nothing on earth would have prevented the demand for 
separation. The South claims to federate with the North, a right that the 
South undoubtedly possesses as a consequence of the principle of free 
self-determination which reason and democracy granted to a free people. 
The South will at any moment separate from the North if and when the 
North so decides directly or indirectly, through political, social and 
economic subjection of the South.1 
Fifty-three years later, the prophecy of Father Lohure turned true, and indeed 
for the reasons he cited—the failure of the Northern Sudanese political leaders to 
deal with South Sudan’s social, political, economic, and cultural differences 
seriously. On January 9, 2011, the Southern Sudanese people exercised their right 
of self-determination and voted by referendum, almost unanimously, to secede 
from Sudan.2 The right of self-determination was granted to them, six years 
before the referendum, by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (“CPA”) that 
was concluded between the government of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army (“SPLM/A”) on January 9, 2005.3 After the end of 
an interim period of six months, the Republic of South Sudan emerged on July 9, 
2011, as the 193rd member of the global family of nations, and as the 54th 
African state.4 
 
* LL.B. University of Khartoum, Sudan; LL.M and J.S.D. Yale Law School, New Haven, Connecticut, 
USA; Fellow, International Water Resources Association (“IWRA”), and academic researcher and consultant 
on water law and policy; former Lead Counsel and Water Law Adviser, The World Bank, Washington D.C.  
1. STEVE A. PATERNO, THE REV. FR. SATURNINO LOHURE: A ROMAN CATHOLIC PRIEST TURNED REBEL, 
THE SOUTH SUDAN EXPERIENCE 119-20 (2007). Father Lohure was elected to the Sudanese national Parliament 
from the Torit district of South Sudan in the March 1958 elections, and was subsequently elected as the leader 
of the Southern block in the Parliament. He was also selected as a member of the Constitution Committee. See 
infra notes 21, 90, 92, 104. 
2. Close to ninety-nine percent of the Southern Sudanese registered voters opted for secession. See 
Results for the Referendum of Southern Sudan, SOUTHERN SUDAN REFERENDUM 2011, http://southernsudan 
2011.com/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
3. Alan Masakhalia Wanga, The South Sudan Independence Referendum, DEMOCRACY INT’L (2011), 
available at http://direct-democracy-navigator.org/system/documents/37/Report%20on%20the%20South%20 
Sudan%20Independence%20Referendum.pdf?1320762493. 
4. South Sudan Becomes an Independent Nation, BBC NEWS (July 8, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 
world-africa-14089843.  
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This Article provides an overview of the turbulent historical relations 
between Sudan North-South, the demands of the people of South Sudan for a 
special political status within a unified Sudan, and how the North adamantly and 
consistently failed to take these demands seriously through a series of broken 
promises and lost opportunities for resolving the problem of South Sudan. After a 
short introduction highlighting these issues, Part II of the Article discusses the 
political geography and history of South Sudan. Part III details the rise of the 
various nationalist movements in both parts of the country, and the futile 
attempts to resolve the Sudan North-South problem and keep the country 
together. Part IV then discusses how the concept of self-determination emerged 
and how it was gradually accepted by the different political groups within the 
North. Next, Part V reviews the Comprehensive Peace Agreement—a set of 
agreements that dealt with the right of self-determination for the Southern 
Sudanese, and the division of wealth and power, as well as the security 
arrangements, during the interim period prior to the referendum. Finally, Part VI 
examines Sudan’s rocky interim period and the emergence of South Sudan as an 
independent nation. The Conclusion highlights some of the main lessons that 
may be learnt from the secession of South Sudan by other nations with culturally 
and racially diversified communities, as well as by the Sudan itself. 
II. POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY OF SOUTH SUDAN 
South Sudan covers an area of about 640,000 square kilometers,5 or about 
twenty-six percent of the total area of Sudan, before the South seceded, of 
approximately 2.5 million square kilometers.6 According to the 2009 National 
Census, the population of Southern Sudan is 8.2 million,7 or twenty-one percent 
of the total 39.1 million population of Sudan.8 It should be added that the parties 
are not in agreement over those figures.9 Large areas in the borders between the 
two countries are still disputed, and South Sudan claimed that large segments of 
its population were not counted.10  
A large part of the population of North Sudan is Arabic-speaking Muslims 
who identify with the Middle East and its Arab-Islamic culture. The percentage 
of Muslims in the North is larger than that of the Arab population because not all 
 
5. Wanga, supra note 3. 
6. Mu Xuequan, Sudan’s Area to Reduce by Quarter After South Sudan Cessation, WINHUANET.COM 
(July 5, 2011), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-07/05/c_13965373.htm. 
7. CORRECTION: Census Shows South Sudan Population at 8.2 Million: Report, SUDAN TRIBUNE (Apr. 
14, 2009), http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article30867.  
8. Sudan: People and Society, CIA: THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ 
the-world-factbook/geos/su.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2013). 
9. South Sudan Will Conduct Fresh Population Census Next Year, SUDAN TRIBUNE (Jan. 9, 2013), 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45114. 
10. Compare Wanga, supra note 3, with Mu Xuequan, supra note 6. 
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the Muslims in the North are Arabs.11 Yet, the Arab culture dominates there.12 As 
Mr. Oluwadare Aguda observed: 
The greatest achievement of Arabism in the Sudan has been the 
unquestioned acceptance of the whole world that this is an Arab state, in 
spite of the fact that only forty percent of the population is Arab. The 
predominance of the Arab Sudanese in the country’s culture, politics, 
administration, commerce and industry makes it de facto an Arab 
Country.13 
The people of South Sudan, on the other hand, are Africans and fall under 
three distinct groups: the Nilotes, the Nilo-Hamites, and the Western Sudanic 
tribes, which are comprised of 572 sub-groups.14 The Nilotes comprise the three 
main tribes in the South, namely the Dinka, the Nuer, and the Shilluk, with the 
Dinka being the largest and most dominant tribe politically and economically.15 
Many of the Southern political leaders, technocrats, and academics belong to the 
Dinka tribe. The domination of the Dinka has, over the years, generated a lot of 
tension between the Dinka and the rest of the Southern Sudanese tribes, and has 
been one major factor in some recent historical and political developments, as 
will be discussed in the course of this Article.16 
The people of South Sudan adhere to a number of indigenous religions, 
although some have embraced Islam and Christianity.17 Indeed, most of the 
political leaders in the South are Christians.18 A wide range of local languages are 
used throughout the South; however, a vernacular form of Arabic is spoken in the 
large cities in the South, and English has been the lingua franca in the 
government offices.19 Thus, the basic differences between the North and the 
South are ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural. The unequal economic 
development between the two parts of the country was another major difference 
that exacerbated the other differences.20 
 
11. Oluwadare Aguda, Arabism and Pan-Arabism in Sudanese Politics, 11 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 117, 117 
(1976). 
12. Id. 
13. See id. 
14. South Sudanese Society, GOV’T OF THE REPUBLIC OF S. SUDAN, http://www.goss-online.org/ 
magnoliaPublic/en/about/society.html (last updated Aug. 19, 2011). 
15. Id.; Dunstan Wai, The Southern Sudan: The Country and the People, in THE SOUTHERN SUDAN: THE 
PROBLEM OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION 7, 9 (Dustan Wai ed., 1973). 
16. See infra Part III.D. 
17. South Sudanese Society, supra note 14. 
18. South Sudan, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/ 
countriesandterritories/south-sudan/index.html. 
19. For a more detailed description of the people of South Sudan and their culture, see Wai, supra note 
15, at 9-10. 
20. Joseph Garang emphasized the disparity in economic development as one key element in the problem 
of South Sudan and argued that “[e]conomic and social progress in the South will definitely lead to an increase 
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The Sudan, with its borders prior to the secession of South Sudan, emerged 
as a result of the Turko-Egyptian conquest in 1821. The ruler of Egypt at that 
time, Mohamed Ali Pasha, conquered the land south of Egypt, and his successors 
reached the current southern borders of South Sudan.21 He moved into the Sudan 
in search of slaves and gold.22 He also wanted to reach the origins of the Nile 
Basin to secure the flow of its waters to Egypt.23 The harsh Turko-Egyptian rule 
in the Sudan continued until 1885, when it was overthrown by the Mahdist 
revolution.24 Slave trade was the dominant feature of the two regimes; the Turko-
Egyptian and Mahdist, and the Northern traders, roamed South Sudan capturing 
hundreds of thousands of Southerners into slavery and brought them to the North, 
where many were exported to Egypt and the rest of the Middle East.25 
Sudan was conquered by the Anglo-Egyptian army in 1898, establishing the 
condominium rule that overthrew and replaced the Mahdist state.26 After 
pacification of the country, the Anglo-Egyptian administration decided to close 
the three provinces constituting Southern Sudan (Bahr el-Ghazal, Equatoria, and 
Upper Nile), and to restrict the movement of people across the borders between 
the two parts of the country.27 Accordingly, the Passports and Permits Ordinance 
was promulgated in 1922, requiring a permit for any Northern Sudanese who 
wanted to travel to the South.28 The justification given for this action was to stop 
the slave trade, which was still prevalent in some remote areas in the South.29 
However, the reasons also included fear by the British of the spread of the 
Islamic religion and Arabic language in the South.30 The closure of the South, and 
its separate administration from the North, continued to be the official policy of 
the colonial administration for the next twenty-five years.31 
One major decision reflecting this policy was taken in the early-to-mid-
1940s. At that time, the condominium administration decided to establish an 
 
in the strength of the democratic movement.” See Joseph Garang, On Economics and Regional Autonomy, in 
THE SOUTHERN SUDAN: THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION, supra note 15, at 83, 91. 
21. History of the Sudan, HIST. WORLD, http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/plaintexthistories. 
asp?historyid=aa86 (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
22. ROBERT COLLINS, THE SOUTHERN SUDAN 1883-1898: A STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL 9 (1962). 
23. History of the Sudan, supra note 21. 
24. Id. 
25. COLLINS, supra note 22; see also P.M. HOLT & M.W. DALY, HISTORY OF THE SUDAN: FROM THE 
COMING OF ISLAM TO THE PRESENT DAY (1988); AMIR H. IDRIS, SUDAN’S CIVIL WAR: SLAVERY, WAR AND 
FORMATIONAL IDENTITIES (2001). 
26. Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon, South Sudan: A History of Political Domination—A Case of Self-
Determination, U. PA. AFR. STUD. CTR. (Nov. 19, 1995), http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/sd_machar.html. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. For a detailed analysis of those developments, see JOSEPH ODUHO & WILLIAM DENG, THE PROBLEM 
OF SOUTHERN SUDAN (1963). 
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advisory council to train the Sudanese in local self-government.32 Membership of 
the council was confined to Northern Sudan, and it was called “The Advisory 
Council of Northern Sudan.”33 The South was left out of the Council and 
continued to be administered separately.34 The Council was inaugurated on May 
15, 1944, and consisted of the Governor-General of the Sudan as president, the 
civil, financial and legal secretaries, and twenty-eight Sudanese members.35 
Exclusion of Southern Sudan was criticized by the nationalist movements in the 
North who saw it as another indication of the intent of the British for the South.36 
The pure advisory role of the Council and its composition were also areas of 
criticism.37 Indeed, the Advisory Council for Northern Sudan provided a potent 
weapon for the rising nationalist movement in Northern Sudan. 
III. THE PROBLEM OF SOUTHERN SUDAN DURING THE  
DIFFERENT POLITICAL ERAS 
A. The Rise of Nationalist Movements in North and South Sudan 
Following the end of the Second World War, Northern Sudanese elites 
started forming political organizations and parties, and demanded an end to 
colonial rule.38 The issue of the unity of the two parts of the country was flagged 
as an important and urgent matter for the Northern elites, particularly after the 
establishment of the Advisory Council of Northern Sudan in 1944.39 The British 
who ruled Southern Sudan in close coordination with their East African colonies 
(Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika) until that time also wanted a resolution of that 
matter.40 Accordingly, a meeting called the “Juba Conference” between some 
Northern political elites and some Southern chiefs was held in Juba in June 
1947.41 That meeting was the first direct contact between Northern and Southern 
political and technocratic elites.42 The Northerners pressed for unity of the 
country and presented to the Southerners what they claimed would be the fruits 
of such unity: a large and strong country, participation in administering the 
 
32. Id. 
33. TIM NIBLOCK, CLASS AND POWER IN SUDAN 123 (1987). 
34. Id. at 159. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. For background information of the Advisory Council, see P.M. HOLT, A MODERN HISTORY OF THE 
SUDAN: FROM THE FUNJ SULTANATE TO PRESENT DAY 146-48 (1961). 
38. See generally Appendix III: Proceedings of the Juba Conference on the Political Development of the 
Southern Sudan, June 1947, in THE SOUTHERN SUDAN: THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION, supra note 
15, at 185. 
39. Id.  
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
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country, equal treatment, jobs, education, and equal pay.43 The Southerners were, 
however, cautious. They demanded that certain safeguards be agreed upon.44 
Such safeguards included recognition of the blotted history of relations between 
the two parts of the country, commitment to equality of citizens, preservation and 
promotion of their cultures (languages, traditions, and customs), and involvement 
of the Southerners in the administration of the country on equal footing.45 They 
demanded an accelerated economic development program for South Sudan.46 
They also asked for more time for interaction and to test the good faith of their 
Northern brothers.47 One Southern representative, Chief Lolik Lado, compared 
the situation to a marriage proposal—the two parties needed more time to know 
and trust each other.48 
Yet, many Northerners claim that the Conference endorsed the unity of the 
country, and Northern politicians kept repeating that claim when challenging the 
demands of Southerners. The Southerners were irritated and angered by the 
Northerners’ claims. Most of them argued that the Southern participants actually 
asked for a transitional period to test the goodwill of the North before agreeing to 
any form of association, while others read the proceedings of the meeting as a 
demand for a federal system of government. Irrespective of how to interpret the 
outcome of the Conference, it should be noted that the Civil Secretary of the 
Sudan, at that time, had already moved in the direction of uniting the Sudan a 
few weeks before the Conference, and had issued his instructions accordingly.49 
The borders were reopened in 1947, after twenty-five years of closure, and 
restrictions on the movement of the people were fully lifted following the 
abolition of the Passports and Permits Ordinance of 1922.50 Although the closure 
of Southern Sudan under the Passports and Permits Ordinance of 1922 lasted for 
only twenty-five years, the Northern Sudanese political leaders would continue 
attributing the lack of integration and communication between the Northern and 
Southern Sudanese, and consequently the civil war itself, to this closure. This 
attempted justification continued and many Northern Sudanese even blame the 
secession of the South, which took place more than sixty years after the policy 
was reversed, on the closure of the South. 
 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. See generally id. 
48. For more details on the Juba Conference and the statement of Chief Lolik Lado, see id. Twenty-eight 
people participated in the Juba Conference: six British officials, five Northern Sudanese, and seventeen 
Southerners, of whom seven were chiefs and the remaining ten were civil servants. 
49. See JAMES ROBERTSON, TRANSITION IN AFRICA 107 (1973). 
50. Teny-Dhurgon, supra note 26. 
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Meanwhile, the political situation was developing rapidly in the North. 
Elections for a Legislative Assembly were held in November 1948,51 although 
they were boycotted by the unionists (those who stood for unity of Egypt and the 
Sudan). In its first major political act, the Assembly represented both parts of the 
Sudan, reversing the British’s Southern policy in the Sudan. Thirteen members 
represented the South, while fifty-two members were directly or indirectly 
elected from the North.52 However, the powers of the Assembly were quite 
curtailed, and were clearly defined. An executive council was also established 
with the Sudanese constituting half of its members, but the Governor General of 
the Sudan continued to be the supreme ruler of the country, with veto powers 
over the decisions of the Council, and the British administrators constituting the 
other half.53 
Negotiations on the future of the Sudan between the Northern political 
parties and the Anglo-Egyptian administration of the Sudan started immediately 
thereafter. These negotiations were concluded on February 12, 1953 in Cairo, and 
led to the Agreement concerning self-government and self-determination for the 
Sudan, with the choice between unity with Egypt, or independence of the 
Sudan.54 Consequently, the Self-Government Statute was adopted on March 21, 
1953 as a transitional constitution for the Sudan until a permanent one was 
adopted (following the exercise by the Sudanese of the right of self-
determination). The Statute mandated the holding of elections for the Parliament 
that would lead the country during the transitional self-government period prior 
to the exercise of the right of self-determination. Those elections were held in 
November 1953 under international supervision.55 
A few years after the Juba Conference, the Southern Sudanese educated class 
started organizing themselves into political parties, as was happening in the 
North. Immediately after the first democratic elections were held in the Sudan in 
November 1953, some of the Southerners who won the elections in the South met 
under the banner of what they called the “Southern Party.” By that time, they had 
already started voicing their anger at being left out of the discussion and 
negotiations of the Sudanese political parties with Egypt and Britain regarding 
the future of the Sudan. This was the beginning of the rift that would keep 
widening after the formation of the first national government. 
 
51. Id. 
52. HOLT, supra note 37, at 153. 
53. See id. at 152-54. 
54. History of Sudan, UNIC KHARTOUM, http://unic.un.org/imucms/khartoum/36/497/history-of-
sudan.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2013). 
55. For a detailed analysis of the 1953 Cairo Agreement and the Self-Government Statute, see HAROLD 
CARMICHAEL, THE SUDAN 291 (1954).  
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B.  The First Civilian Era 1954–1958: Outbreak of the Civil War 
The National Unionist Party (“NUP”), which stood for unity with Egypt, 
emerged as the winning party in the elections of November 1953, held under the 
Self-Government Statute of 1953.56 Subsequently, the NUP leader, Ismail Al-
Azhari, was elected as the first Prime Minister of the Sudan.57 He formed his 
government in January 1954, and his cabinet included three Southerners as state, 
rather than full, ministers.58 That was a major disappointment to the Southerners, 
who expected at least two full cabinet seats, as indicated in the 1953 Agreement. 
The exclusion of the Southerners from the 1953 negotiations, and the failure to 
appoint full ministers from the South already started sowing the seeds of distrust 
and discontent. Those feelings were soon exacerbated by the results of the 
Sudanization of the civil service posts that were formerly filled by British and 
Egyptian staff. Only six out of 800 posts went to the Southerners, and they were 
mostly junior posts. The promises of the Juba Conference for jobs and equal 
treatment were already forgotten.59 Thus, even before the independence of the 
Sudan on January 1, 1956, “[t]he disappointment over broken promises, the 
resentment at the constant overlooking of the South’s political interests, and the 
alienation brought on by instances of insensitivity shown by inexperienced 
northern officials drafted to the South, all created growing spirit of unrest in 
Southern Sudan in 1954 and 1955.”60 
Three more major developments took place that widened the rift further 
between the North and the South. The Southern politicians who formed the 
Southern Party and some other Southern intellectuals joined together and formed 
a new party called the “Liberal Party.” The Liberal Party decided to hold a 
conference in Juba to discuss the future relations between the two parts of the 
country and planned to invite all the Southern educated class to attend. However, 
the Prime Minister, Mr. Al-Azhari, objected to the participation of Southerners 
who were government employees in this conference because of their official 
status. He further threatened anyone who would participate in this conference 
with dismissal from government employment. The Liberal Party, however, went 
ahead with the conference and included government employees from the South, 
simply ignoring the warnings of the Prime Minister. The conference was held in 
 
56. History of Sudan, supra note 54. 
57. Id. 
58. The three Southerners who were selected by Mr. Al-Azhari as state ministers were Messrs. Pauline 
Alier, Santino Deng, and Dak Dei. Mr. Siricio Iro was selected in 1956 as a member of the Supreme Council of 
State (the collective head of state), the first Southern Sudanese to be selected as a member of the Council. The 
presidency of the Council would rotate every month amongst the five members. Thus, the Southern member 
would have the opportunity to become president of the Council at least two months a year. This arrangement 
was replaced in 1965 by a permanent presidency. See ABDEL MAGID BOB, SOUTH SUDAN: THE DEBATE OF 
UNITY AND SECESSION (2009) (in Arabic). 
59. For a discussion of those issues, see OLIVER ALBINO, THE SUDAN: A SOUTHERN VIEWPOINT (1970). 
60. NIBLOCK, supra note 33, at 216. 
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October 1954 in Juba, and discussed a number of issues including the future 
relations between the North and the South. On the last day of the conference, the 
party adopted a resolution, passed almost unanimously by the 227 attendees, 
demanding a federal system of government for Southern Sudan.61 Henceforth, 
federation became the official position of the Liberal Party, and the Party carried 
that demand and presented it to Mr. Al-Azhari’s government in Khartoum. 
Unfortunately, as will be discussed later, Mr. Al-Azhari and his government, as 
well as the opposition Umma Party, reacted in a dismissive manner, and did not 
give that demand any serious thought or consideration. 
The second development was the most serious of all. On August 18, 1955, 
the Equatorial Corps of the Sudan Defense Force in the Southern Sudanese city 
of Torit refused the order of their transfer to the North and mutinied because they 
were apprehensive and concerned about the transfer.62 The disturbances soon 
extended to many other parts of South Sudan. The result was the killing of 366 
Northerners and seventy-five Southerners during the disturbances. Some of the 
mutineer soldiers fled to the bush, sowing the seeds for the civil war that would 
soon engulf the South.63 The reaction of the government was, unfortunately, quite 
harsh and swift. Instead of looking into the causes and grievances that caused the 
mutiny and trying to address them in a responsible and stately manner, the 
government took harsh measures. Southerners suspected of involvement in the 
disturbances were arrested and brought to swift trials, and some were sentenced 
to death and executed, while others were sent on long-term jail sentences. A third 
group was simply kept in jail awaiting trial for a long time. 
The two addresses Prime Minister Al-Azhari gave to the Parliament on 
August 26, 1955 and November 2, 1955 reflected an unfortunate view of the 
situation. He called the disturbances a serious mutiny against law and military 
orders and elaborated on the harsh measures and heavy-handed approach his 
government was adopting. He called on the soldiers who participated in the 
mutiny to surrender and face trials for their actions and warned the chiefs who 
would shelter any such persons with harsh consequences.64 Although he 
announced the formation of a committee to inquire into the disturbances and 
present a report,65 he went on condemning the Southern policemen and accused 
 
61. For a detailed analysis of the proceedings of this Conference and the demand for federation, see BOB, 
supra note 58, at 60-70. Of the 227 participants in the meeting, 220 voted for federation. It is worth noting that 
this near unanimous vote in favor of federation in 1954 was repeated fifty-seven years later in the near 
unanimous vote in favor of secession on January 9, 2011. See James Gadet Dak, South Sudan Celebrates Torit 
Revolution Day of 1955, SUDAN TRIBUNE (Aug. 19, 2008), http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article 
28325. 
62. See Dak, supra note 61. 
63. Sudan—History, MONGABAY.COM, http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/sudan/ 
HISTORY.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2013). 
64. For the address of the Prime Minister of November 2, 1955, referring to his address of August 26, 
1955, see BOB, supra note 58, at 453. 
65. See GOV’T OF SUDAN, REPORT OF THE INQUIRY COMMITTEE ON THE SOUTHERN SUDAN 
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them of participation in the disturbances and the breach of law and order. It was 
not clear what the role of the committee of inquiry would be after the Prime 
Minister made his announcements and took his measures. Henceforth, 
Southerners who revolted against their treatment by the Khartoum government 
were termed “mutineers.” The “mutiny,” as the civil war was formally termed by 
all successive governments in Khartoum, would soon engulf the South and last 
for over half a century, except for a brief period between 1972 and 1983, as 
discussed later.66 
The third development concerned the demands of the South for a federal 
system of government. The Southerners agreed to support the resolution for the 
independence of the Sudan that would be tabled before the Parliament at the end 
of the self-government period provided that it included a reference to the federal 
system of government, which was demanded by the 1954 Juba Conference of the 
Liberal Party. The government of Mr. Al-Azhari, and the opposition led by Mr. 
Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub representing the Umma Party, both agreed to include 
this demand in the independence resolution. Indeed, the Parliament unanimously 
adopted, on December 19, 1955, the independence resolution, which also stated 
“[t]he request by Southern members of Parliament for a federal status of the 
South will be given due consideration by the Constituent Assembly.”67 
Consequently, the Northern and Southern members of the Parliament voted for 
the independence resolution and Sudan gained its independence on January 1, 
1956.68 The referendum provided for under the 1953 Agreement concerning self-
government, and under the Self-Government Statute, was simply replaced by the 
December 19, 1955 parliamentary resolution on independence. The Southerners 
claim that agreement by the Northern political parties to a federal system of 
government was the quid pro quo for the South’s vote for independence. In other 
words, it was a package deal.69 
It turned out that neither the government nor the opposition took their 
promise or the resolution seriously. The government did not follow up with any 
action or conduct a study on how to move forward with a federal system of 
government. The leader of the opposition, Mr. Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub, 
remarked a few months later that the inclusion of the reference to the federal 
 
DISTURBANCES DURING AUGUST 1955 (1956). Judge Tawfik Cotran headed that committee of inquiry, and the 
report is referred to as the Cotran Report. The report was critical of the heavy-handed manner with which the 
disturbances were handled. It also criticized the huge promises made by Mr. Al-Azhari government in 1954 for 
jobs and equal pay, stating that those promises raised the expectations of the Southerners. It indicated that the 
failure to meet them, and the results of the Sudanization process that gave the Southerners only six out of 800 
posts, had contributed immensely to the disturbances. Id. 
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67. History of Sudan, supra note 54. 
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system for the South “was meant to make the Southerners happy and get them to 
go along with the independence resolution.”70 
In July 1956, Mr. Al-Azhari’s government was voted out of office after some 
members of the NUP ruling party broke away and established a new party, the 
People’s Democratic Party (“PDP”). The Umma Party formed a government 
headed by Mr. Abdallah Khalil as the Prime Minister, in coalition with the newly 
formed PDP. The same coalition government with the same Prime Minister 
continued in power after the Umma Party emerged as the winning party in the 
March 1958 elections of the Constituent Assembly. The primary task of the 
Constituent Assembly was the drafting of a permanent constitution. The Sudan 
Self-Government Statute, which was the constitution of the Sudan during the 
transitional era prior to independence, was retailored in a hurry and issued as the 
Sudan Transitional Constitution of 1956 a few days prior to the declaration of 
independence of the Sudan. 
A Constitution Committee consisting of members of the Constituent 
Assembly was established in 1958 to prepare a draft constitution to replace the 
Transitional Constitution of 1956.71 Of its forty-six members, only three were 
from South Sudan—a gross under-representation. After a few days of 
deliberations, the Committee indicated that it had given “due consideration” to 
the request of the South for a federal system of government, as mandated by the 
1955 resolution, and decided that federation would not be an appropriate form of 
government for the Sudan. Sadly, the government and the opposition felt that 
their only obligation under the resolution was to give only “due consideration” to 
the request, and this took place almost three years after the resolution was 
adopted in 1955. 
As if that was not enough, the Constitution Committee started drafting a 
constitution for an Arab-Islamic Sudan, with Sharia (Islamic law) being the main 
source for legislation and Arabic being the official language for the whole 
country. The Prime Minister, Mr. Abdallah Khalil, his Umma Party, their 
coalition partners in the PDP, as well as the opposition NUP, were all pushing for 
the Arab-Islamic constitution. Understandably, the three Southern members of 
the Committee, led by Father Lohure, walked out in protest over both denial of 
federation to South Sudan and insistence on an Arab-Islamic constitution.72 
The rift between the North and the South was clearly widening by the day in 
the mid-to-late-1950s.73 By that time, the low-intensity civil war had already 
cropped up in many areas in the South. While the Constitution Committee was 
drafting the Arab-Islamic constitution, the two political parties of the government 
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were plotting against each other. Realizing that he would be voted out of office, 
the Prime Minister, Mr. Abdallah Khalil, instructed the army to take over power. 
General Ibrahim Abboud did so on November 17, 1958,74 ending the first civilian 
era in the Sudan, as well as the post-independence dreams of democracy, 
freedom, and rule of law. 
C.  The First Military Rule 1958–1964: Intensification of the Civil War 
Mr. Abdallah Khalil instructed the military to take over because of the rivalry 
between the Umma Party, the NUP, and the PDP. The 1956 Transitional 
Constitution that was tailored in a hurry from the Self-Government Statute of 
1953, and that continued as the supreme law of Sudan during the first civilian 
era, was suspended. The country would be governed for the next six years by 
military decrees. Notably, the ruling military council did not include a single 
Southerner and the cabinet had only one Southerner as minister (for the Ministry 
of Animal Resources) during the entire six years. 
Consequently, civil liberties were suspended and the political parties 
dissolved. However, a few days after the coup, Sayyed Abdel Rahman Al-Mahdi, 
the leader of the Ansar sect that is the backbone of the Umma Party, issued a 
statement endorsing the coup.75 This was followed immediately by a similar 
statement of endorsement of the coup by Sayyed Ali Al-Mirghani, the leader of 
the Khatmiyya sect that is the backbone of the PDP. The endorsements reflected 
the approval of the two parties of the military takeover, as well as the rivalry 
between them in all political matters of the Sudan, including rapprochement with 
military rulers. The rivalry extended later to the appeasement of the SPLM, as 
will be seen in the course of this Article.76 
The army takeover paved the way for an unchecked military response to the 
problem of South Sudan. Although the military government of General Abboud 
did not declare an Arab-Islamic state or promulgate an Islamic constitution for 
the Sudan, it moved swiftly to Arabize and Islamize the South. That was how the 
army officers, and the civilians who joined them, naively perceived the solution 
of the problem of Southern Sudan. For them, the problem was simply one of 
national integration that could be achieved by spreading and imposing an Arab-
Islamic culture throughout Southern Sudan. Thus, forced Arabization and 
Islamization became the official policy of the regime. 
General Abboud’s government decreed that Arabic language would replace 
English and the local languages in the South, and that it would be the media of 
instruction in schools and the lingua franca in the government offices. Those 
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offices would henceforth have to work in Arabic, and those who did not know 
Arabic were removed. It should be added that Arabic language was introduced in 
the schools in Southern Sudan in 1949, immediately after the Passports and 
Permits was abolished in 1947, but it was taught together with English 
language.77 
Christian missionaries, totaling more than three hundred, were expelled, and 
a new law, the Missionary Societies Act, was promulgated in 1962, requiring a 
license for any missionary that wanted to work in the South.78 Friday was 
declared the day of rest instead of Sunday. Christian and local names were 
discouraged and replaced by Arabic/Islamic names. Mosques and Koranic 
schools were opened in many areas in the South with a concomitant closure of 
churches and missionary schools. 
In addition to these provocative measures, the government announced that 
the South was in mutiny and a military response was required.79 The military 
governors of the three Southern provinces were given a free hand to deal, as they 
deemed fit, with the situation in their respective provinces. Atrocities were 
reported throughout the South, and a large number of Southern Sudanese, 
particularly politicians and the educated class, fled the country to the neighboring 
African countries, particularly Kenya and Uganda.80 
Under the Passports and Permits Ordinance of 1922, Southern Sudan was 
closed for Northern Sudanese to, inter alia, avoid spread of Islam and the Arabic 
language.81 Under the Missionary Societies Act of 1962, the South was closed for 
the rest of the world to give absolute hegemony for Islam and Arabic language.82 
Northern Sudanese were banned from the South in 1922. In the 1960s, only 
Northern Sudanese were allowed in the South. Rather than integrate the South 
with the North, as the Abboud government naively thought, these measures 
helped unify the Southerners, and the low-intensity civil war gradually became a 
full-fledged, high-intensity war spreading throughout Southern Sudan. 
The Northern Sudanese, tired of the war that took its toll on their relatives 
and friends, as well as on the economy, and longing for a democratic rule and 
freedom, revolted in October 196483 and overthrew General Abboud’s 
government. The call for a peaceful resolution of the Southern Sudan problem 
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81. Teny-Dhurgon, supra note 26. 
82. Francis M. Deng, Sudan—Civil War and Genocide: Disappearing Christians of the Middle East, 8 M. 
E. Q. 13 (Winter 2001). 
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was high on the agenda of the October revolution. A new era dawned on Sudan, 
which, unfortunately, would prove another lost opportunity for resolution of the 
problem of Southern Sudan and restoration of the rule of law and respect for the 
basic human rights. 
D.  The Second Civilian Era 1964–1969: The Roundtable Conference 
The October revolution succeeded in forcing General Abboud to disband his 
regime and hand over power to the civilian groups,84 comprising the political 
parties and trade unions that led the revolution. The 1956 Transitional 
Constitution was revived by agreement among the political parties and trade 
unions, retailored again in a hurry, and termed the Transitional Constitution of 
1956, as amended in 1964.85 Consequently, a civilian transitional government 
was formed in November 1964, mostly from technocrats, and one of its urgent 
tasks was addressing and trying to resolve the problem of Southern Sudan.86 The 
government included two ministers from South Sudan. One of them, Mr. 
Clement Mboro, was assigned to the Ministry of Interior. This was the first time 
a Southerner was assigned an important ministry. Assigning the ministry that 
oversaw law and order in the whole country to a Southerner was presented as a 
goodwill gesture and confidence-building measure by the North, and was viewed 
positively by some segments of Southern Sudanese. 
The suggestion of one Southern political leader, Mr. William Deng, for 
holding a roundtable conference for discussing and agreeing on a solution for the 
Southern Sudan problem was accepted by the transitional government and all the 
political parties in Sudan. After all, this was one major reason for the October 
revolution and a major component of the National Charter. Preparations for that 
conference were soon underway. Two major issues had to be dealt with and 
resolved before the conference could be convened. The first was where to hold 
the conference. The Southerners insisted that the conference be held in a neutral 
location outside Sudan, while the Northern political parties insisted that it be held 
in Khartoum. The Northerners cited the political change in Sudan following the 
overthrow of Abboud’s regime and the democratic environment in which the 
Southern political parties were themselves operating. The Southerners in the 
Sudan were able to persuade a large number of those in exile to drop this 
demand, and they agreed to hold the conference in Khartoum. 
The second issue was the participation of observers in the conference. The 
Southerners insisted that observers from the United Nations, the Organization of 
the African Unity (“OAU”), as well as all of Sudan’s neighboring countries be 
invited. The Northerners argued that the conference was a purely Sudanese 
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matter and attendance should be limited to Sudanese only. They were opposed to 
the invitation of the United Nations and OAU, and they argued that this would be 
interpreted as an internationalization of the North-South Conflict. After lengthy 
negotiations, they agreed to invite Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria, Egypt, 
Ghana, and Algeria as observers. The Southerners also dropped their demand for 
lifting the state of emergency in the South after it was agreed that there would be 
a ceasefire as soon as the conference would start. 
Five months after the October revolution, the roundtable conference was 
underway. The conference started on March 15 and closed on March 26, 1965.87 
Each political party in the North and the South sent its representative to the 
conference. A number of Southern Sudan representatives returned from 
neighboring countries, where they were in exile, for the roundtable conference. 
However, they represented different groups and ideas. 
The Prime Minister of the transitional government, Mr. Sirr Al-Khatim Al-
Khalifa, delivered the inauguration address to the conference. He admitted to the 
basic differences between the two parts of the country as well as the low state of 
economic development in the South. However, he attributed that situation, as 
well as the lack of integration and communication between the two parts of the 
country, to the British colonialist policy that closed Southern Sudan, prevented 
communication between the two parts of the country, and failed to undertake any 
development projects. He promised a new era, and new policies that would aim 
at equality and respect. As indicated earlier, the closure of the Southern Sudan 
under the Passports and Permits Ordinance lasted for only twenty-five years and 
was reversed in 1947. 
Mr. Aggrey Jaden, speaking on behalf of the Southerners who came from 
exile, set a different tone. He was extremely sharp in his criticism of the 
Northerners for the civil war and the atrocities in the South. He reiterated the 
major differences between the two parts of the country and reminded the 
Northerners of their dishonor regarding the agreement on a federal system of 
government, which was agreed upon in December 1955. He stated that things had 
changed since that time and it was time that the South be allowed to secede from 
the Sudan. Thus, separation was Mr. Jaden’s main theme, message, and demand. 
Mr. Gordon Mortat, another Southern Sudanese leader who also returned for the 
conference from abroad, was less sharp in his criticism of the North. After 
reiterating the grievances of the Southerners, he demanded that the Southern 
Sudanese be allowed to exercise the right of self-determination and decide their 
own destiny. Mr. William Deng, representing a large segment of the Southern 
Sudanese political leaders, reiterated the earlier demand of federation. He argued 
that federation was the only way to end the conflict and accommodate the socio-
economic and cultural differences between the two parts of the country. He 
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reminded both the Southerners, calling for separation, and the Northerners, 
insisting on unity, that this was the demand of the Liberal Party in 1954, and the 
one that formed part of the package deal for the 1955 independence resolution. 
The Northern political parties’ representatives were functioning under a 
completely different paradigm. They made it clear that they were totally opposed 
to the break-up of the country, just as they were opposed to the right of self-
determination, and insisted on a unified Sudan as the starting point for the 
conference.88 They further argued that federation was simply the first step 
towards secession. 
At the conference, the Southern Sudanese spoke with more than one voice. 
Rather than sticking to their earlier demand of federation, demands for 
separation, right of self-determination, and federation were all on the table from 
their side. The Northerners insisted on a unified country, claiming that the whole 
country exercised the right of self-determination in 1955, and opted for 
independence and unity of the country. Accordingly, the roundtable conference 
turned into a dialogue of the deaf. It ended twelve days later without an 
agreement on how to resolve the Southern problem, although it was agreed that 
the two extreme positions—separation and the then existing centralized system of 
government—would not be appropriate to pursue. 
Nonetheless, one could argue that the demands of the Southerners for 
separation or self-determination were negotiating tactics. They raised the bar so 
they could compromise for something less—federation. Indeed, the three 
Southern speakers reminded their Northern counterparts of the 1955 Sudanese 
Parliament resolution on federation. The resolution could have been a middle 
point where the two parties would meet. This was clear from the address of Mr. 
William Deng, who stressed the federal system of government as a way for 
accommodating the cultural, religious, ethnic, linguistic, and economic 
differences between the two parts of the country. Mr. Deng was considered by 
most participants and observers of the conference as the voice of moderation and 
reason in that conference. Indeed, the whole idea of the roundtable conference 
was his. Yet, his voice seemed as one in the wilderness. The Northerners 
vigorously attacked and opposed federation and strongly and loudly asserted the 
supremacy and dominance of their Arab-Islamic culture. That must have widened 
the rift between the two parties. It was unfortunate that the Northern political 
leaders would keep claiming that the entire country exercised its right of self-
determination in 1955 and opted for a united independent Sudan. The reply the 
Southerners kept repeating was that their vote for independence was based on an 
agreement for federation. The claims of the Northern political leaders that due 
consideration was indeed given to the demand, which was rejected, was also 
inappropriate and was counterproductive. It kept irritating and angering the 
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Southerners. Similarly, the Northerners’ argument that the Juba Conference 
opted for unity, such that the issue was no longer open for discussion or 
negotiations, was unfortunate and historically incorrect. Thus, the Northern 
political leaders threw out a golden opportunity for righting their own wrongs, 
ending the civil war, and keeping the country unified. They simply blundered that 
opportunity. 
To save face, the conference agreed on the establishment of a twelve-man 
committee, representing the Northern and Southern political parties, to look 
further into the issues raised at the conference and come up with some 
recommendations. The participants also agreed to convene three months later to 
discuss the report of this committee. By that time, the Northern political parties 
were engaged in a feverish race for winning the parliamentary elections and 
forming the new government, and their leaders were jockeying for ministerial 
positions. The Southern problem started to gradually take a back seat in their 
priorities. The civil war dragged on, but the country, it seemed, had gotten used 
to it by that time. 
The twelve-man committee soon ran into problems. The Southerners who 
came from exile for the conference, and who left by that time, would soon inform 
the secretariat of the committee that the Southerners in the committee did not 
represent them.89 A few weeks later, the People’s Democratic Party and the 
Communist Party withdrew from the committee protesting the committee’s 
failure to condemn the Southern parties for their failure to stop the attacks on the 
main towns in the South. This was a strange demand because the whole purpose 
behind the conference was to resolve the Southern problem, of which the military 
attacks from both sides was one major issue. Besides, the parties had not reached 
a formal ceasefire agreement. 
The March 1965 elections brought the Umma Party back to power,90 and the 
party formed a new coalition government with the NUP, headed by Mr. 
Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub,91 with Mr. Al-Azhari heading the Supreme Council 
of State (or the presidency).92 The Constitution was amended to end the rotating 
presidency of the Council,93 and Mr. Azhari was appointed as the permanent 
president. This deal between the two Northern political parties deprived the 
Southern member of ever being the president of the Council, and exacerbated the 
anger and grievances of the Southerners.94 
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It may be recalled that Mr. Mahjoub remarked about ten years earlier95 that 
the reference to the federal system for the South in the independence resolution 
was meant to make the Southerners happy and to get them to go along with the 
resolution. Along those lines, he wasted no time in criticizing the twelve-man 
committee, declaring that it failed in its mandate. In fact, the committee 
presented its report on June 26, 1965, recommending devolution of some powers 
to the three provincial governments in the South (Bahr el-Ghazal, Equatoria, and 
Upper Nile),96 but this recommendation had already been overtaken by Mr. 
Mahjoub’s approach and proposed solution of the Southern problem. 
Mr. Mahjoub’s government decided to intensify the military campaign, 
arguing that the divisions within the Southern political parties (especially 
between those who returned to exile and those who remained inside the Sudan, as 
appeared during the roundtable conference) would help the government win the 
war. He managed to get the Constituent Assembly to pass a unanimous resolution 
authorizing his government to restore law and order in the South. Sadly, the 
problem of Southern Sudan was relegated to a law and order one, and Mr. 
Mahjoub was given a free hand in conducting the war to restore law and order.97 
Consequently, Mr. Mahjoub turned the whole Southern Sudan into a full war 
zone. Mr. William Deng, a leading Southern politician and the driving force 
behind the round table conference, was killed on May 28, 1968 in the South, and 
all the fingers pointed at the government army.98 Another Southern political 
leader, Father Saturnino Lohure, was killed a few months later under very 
suspect circumstances in Uganda.99 Moreover, close to 500 Southern civilians 
were killed by the Sudanese army in two incidents in Juba and Wau, one of them 
during a wedding ceremony. The government was no longer interested in any 
further contact or dialogue with the Southern politicians and was under no 
pressure to do so because the problem was, for the government and the 
opposition, one of law and order. The former military ruler of the Sudan, General 
Abboud, must have wondered how a popularly-elected government would be 
allowed to replicate the same flawed approach and policies that his military 
government tried, in vain, for close to six years, and that were among the main 
reasons for the fall of his regime. 
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As if the situation in Southern Sudan was not enough, the country was soon 
engulfed in a major constitutional crisis.100 Following a motion presented by the 
Umma Party, the NUP, and the Islamic Charter Front (“ICF”), the Constituent 
Assembly passed a resolution dissolving the Sudanese Communist Party and 
expelling its eleven members from the Assembly. The justification given was that 
the party espoused atheism as its ideology, which a Muslim nation should not 
tolerate.101 The leaders of the Umma Party (Mr. Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub and 
his rival, Mr. Sadig Al-Mahdi), the NUP (Mr. Al-Azhari, who was the President 
of the Supreme Council of State), and the ICF (Mr. Hassan Al-Turabi) pushed 
hard for, and managed to get, the resolution adopted by the Assembly.102 
Although the High Court decided a few months later that the dissolution of the 
Communist Party was not constitutional, Mr. Sadig Al-Mahdi, who replaced Mr. 
Mahjoub by that time as Prime Minister, refused to abide by that judgment. He 
stated that the judgment was “declaratory” and not binding on his government. 
The principles of the October revolution—democracy, freedom of speech and 
association, independence of the judiciary, and the peaceful resolution of the 
Southern problem—were being systematically dismantled one after the other by 
the Umma, NUP, PDP, and ICF. The PDP would soon merge with the NUP to 
form the Democratic Unionist Party (“DUP”), which continued with the same 
policies and ideology of the NUP.103 However, like the Umma Party, which was 
dominated by the Al-Mahdi family and the Ansar sect, the DUP would be 
dominated by the Khatmiyya sect led by Mr. Mohamed Osman Al-Mirghani and 
his family.104 Politics in the Sudan was clearly a family business and was 
dominated by the rivalry between the two families, sects, and their leaders. 
Soon, those three Islamist parties (the Umma, DUP, and ICF) formed the 
Constitution Committee and embarked on the task of drafting an Arab-Islamic 
constitution, thus continuing where the 1958 committee stopped, following the 
1958 coup d’etat.105 The new committee was already guided by the oft-quoted 
crux of the address of Prime Minister Sadig Al-Mahdi to the Constituent 
Assembly: “[t]he dominant feature of our nation is an Islamic one, and its over-
powering expression is Arab, and this nation will not have its entity identified 
and its prestige and pride preserved except under an Islamic revival.”106 The 
nation he was talking about was obviously the whole Sudanese nation, 
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Southerners included. Along the same lines, if not worse, Mr. Hassan Al-Turabi, 
leader of the ICF, was quoted as stating that the South had no culture, so this 
vacuum would necessarily be filled by Arab culture under an Islamic revival.107 
Mr. Ali Abdel Rahman, a leading member of the NUP (then the PDP and later 
the DUP) and a cabinet member in two governments, also added his party’s voice 
to this exclusivist chorus. He stated that Sudan is an integral part of the Arab-
Islamic nation, and those who do not like it should pack up and leave.108 The 
Southerners in the Constitution Committee did just that. As happened in 1958, 
they walked out of the Committee in October 1968 in protest over the proposed 
Arab-Islamic constitution being prepared by the Committee.109 
The intensification of the war in the South, the political in-fighting within the 
government and the two coalition parties, and the controversies with the judiciary 
over the government’s refusal to implement the decision on the 
unconstitutionality of the dissolution of the Communist Party, paved the way for 
the return of the country to military rule in May 1969 and the end of the second 
civilian era. Another golden opportunity for resolution of the Southern Sudan 
problem, the roundtable conference, was wasted. 
E.  The Second Military Rule 1969–1985: The Addis Ababa Agreement 
Colonel Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri and his fellow officers overthrew the 
ineffective civilian government of Mr. Mahjoub in a bloodless coup on May 25, 
1969, bringing back military rule to the Sudan in less than fifteen years after 
independence. The coup was supported by the leftwing parties, particularly the 
Sudanese Communist Party which was trying to avenge its dissolution. The war 
in the South was again quoted by the leaders of the coup as one of the main 
reasons for their “May Revolution.”110 
On June 9, 1969, two weeks after the coup, the government announced a 
Policy Statement on Southern Sudan, termed the 9th of June Declaration.111 The 
Declaration recognized for the first time the historical and cultural differences 
between the North and the South, and affirmed the right of the Southerners to 
develop their cultures and traditions within a unified Sudan.112 The Declaration 
outlined a program for Southern Sudan, which included an amnesty for all 
Southerners involved in the conflict; “economic, social and cultural development 
of the South;” and “appointment of a minister for Southern Affairs.”113 Mr. 
 
107. See id. 
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109. Alier, supra note 106, at 24. 
110. Id. at 25-26. 
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Statement on the Southern Question, 9th June,1969, in THE SOUTHERN SUDAN: THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL 
[1] SALMAN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 7/22/2013 4:13 PM 
2013 / South Sudan Road to Independence 
364 
Joseph Garang, a Southern Sudanese lawyer and a leading member of the 
Sudanese Communist Party, was appointed to the Ministry of Southern Affairs. 
Another Southern Sudanese lawyer and politician, Mr. Abel Alier, was appointed 
as a Minister of Housing. 
The Declaration set in motion a lengthy and complex process of contacts 
between the new government and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement 
(“SSLM”), headed by Mr. Joseph Lagu, which was fighting the war in the South. 
The contacts led to some secret meetings, and those meetings were subsequently 
followed by negotiations between the two parties. The negotiations, which started 
in February 1972 at Addis Ababa, were mediated by the World Council of 
Churches and the Ethiopian government. One interesting observation about the 
negotiations was that the government of Sudan’s team included a Southern 
Sudanese, Mr. Abel Alier, who was the Minister of Housing in Mr. Nimeiri’s 
government. 
After lengthy negotiations, the two parties signed, on March 12, 1972, the 
Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of Southern Sudan. The Agreement 
comprised of the basic law for the organization of regional autonomy in the three 
Southern Sudan Provinces, which were called the “Southern Region,” and five 
protocols (or chapters, namely, (i) the Amnesty and Judicial arrangements, (ii) 
the administrative arrangements for the interim period until the establishment of 
the institutions for regional autonomy mentioned in the basic law, (iii) the cease 
fire arrangements, (iv) the temporary arrangements concerning the armed forces, 
and (v) the resettlement and rehabilitation of the Southern Sudan refugees).114 The 
basic law was adopted by the government in Khartoum on March 3, 1972, and 
was called the “Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act, 1972” 
(“Self-Government Act”). Under this law, Southern Sudan (which was termed 
the “Southern Region”) was granted regional autonomy. A People’s Regional 
Council would be elected by the citizens of the Southern Region, with full 
authority to legislate on all local matters. The matters considered as national, and 
excluded from the regional authority, included: (i) national defense, (ii) external 
affairs, (iii) currency and coinage, (iv) air and inter-regional transport, (v) 
communications and telecommunications, (vi) customs and foreign trade except 
for border trade and certain commodities, which the Regional Government may 
specify with the approval of the Central Government, (vii) nationality and 
immigration, and (viii) planning for economic and social development.115 
A High Executive Council would be established, headed by a president 
nominated by the People’s Regional Council and appointed by the President of 
 
INTEGRATION, supra note 15, at 219. 
114. The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of South Sudan, Gov’t of the Democratic Republic of 
the Sudan-The S. Sudan Liberation Movement, Feb. 27, 1972, available at http://madingaweil.com/addis-
ababa-peace-agreement-1972.htm. 
115. Id. at ch. III, art. 7. 
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the Republic.116 Its authority was to execute regional policies and plans. Mr. Abel 
Alier was appointed as President of the High Executive Council. Mr. Joseph 
Lagu, the leader of the SSLM, was appointed Commander of the Sudanese Army 
in the Southern Region, with the rank of Major General. 
Thus, the civil war that started in 1955 came to an end in 1972, although 
temporarily, after seventeen years of killings and destruction. The South was 
given full authority over all local matters. That was satisfactory to most of the 
Southerners, although there were dissenting views. Whether to call this 
arrangement regional autonomy or federation did not seem to make much of a 
difference to the Southerners, who endorsed it because the powers of each 
government were clearly defined. Mr. Nimeiri was hailed by the Southerners as a 
national hero and peacemaker. Mr. Dunstan Wai wrote, “President [Nimeiri] has 
certainly won the confidence and trust of the peoples of the South as he has 
proved himself a man of his own word. For the first time in the history of 
independent Sudan, the country has found a man of strong personality, blessed 
with vision and certain ideals which have the merit of being intensely 
practicable.”117 Mr. Francis Deng was more restrained as he stated, “[r]egional 
self-rule is the best solution the President could have adopted, and it should be 
viewed as a giant step toward an ultimate solution.”118 Both men, as well as the 
entire population of South Sudan, would soon be disappointed over the gradual 
tearing apart by Mr. Nimeiri of the Addis Ababa Agreement. 
However, this high praise for Mr. Nimeiri and the enthusiastic support to the 
Addis Ababa Agreement among the Southerners was not shared by the 
Northerners. Between May 1969 and March 1972, when the Addis Ababa 
Agreement was signed, Mr. Nimeiri alienated almost all the Northern political 
groups. Political parties were banned, their leaders jailed, and properties 
confiscated. When the Ansar sect revolted against Mr. Nimeiri in March 1970, he 
dealt with them in an extremely harsh manner. He attacked the Ansar in 
Omdurman and Aba Island, their citadel, and massacred thousands of them.119 
That attack was followed a few days later with the killing of their spiritual leader, 
Imam Al-Hadi Al-Mahdi.120 Those killings created bitter feelings among the 
followers and supporters of the Umma Party and lead to calls for revenge. 
A failed coup, supported by the Communist Party in July 1971, was followed 
by the brutal executions of those accused of involvement. Among those executed 
were Mr. Abdel Khalig Mahjoub, the Secretary-General of the Party, Mr. Joseph 
 
116. As discussed later, Mr. Nimeiri became President of the Sudan after a plebiscite in August 1971.  
117. See Epilogue, in THE SOUTHERN SUDAN: THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION, supra note 15, 
at 173, 174. 
118. FRANCIS DENG, DYNAMICS OF IDENTIFICATION: A BASIS FOR NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE 
SUDAN 7 (1973). 
119. The Nimeiri Era, 1969-95, COUNTRY STUDIES, http://countrystudies.us/sudan/23.htm (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2013.) 
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Garang, the Minister of Southern Affairs in Nimeiri’s government, and Mr. El-
Shafie Ahmed El-Sheikh, the Secretary-General of the Sudan Workers Union.121 
This was accompanied by a wide purge of those accused of having leftist 
leanings in the civil service and educational institutions and the detention of tens 
of thousands. 
A few weeks after the attempted coup, Mr. Nimeiri held a typical third-world 
plebiscite and announced that he won the Presidency of Sudan by the usual close-
to-ninety-nine percent vote.122 He appointed Mr. Abel Alier as Vice President, the 
first Southerner to hold this position. This was followed by the establishment of 
the Sudanese Socialist Union (“SSU”), the government party and only political 
organization allowed in the Sudan. Thus, when the Addis Ababa Agreement was 
concluded in March 1972, the Sudan was under an oppressive military 
dictatorship and a one-party, perhaps more precisely, one-man, rule. 
Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that no popular support or 
enthusiasm for the Addis Ababa Agreement emerged in the North. The man who 
was perceived by the Southerners as blessed with vision and ideals, and called 
President by them, was considered by most of the Northerners as a bloody, 
ruthless dictator. Indeed, some Northern politicians and intellectuals doubted the 
genuineness of Mr. Nimeiri, and claimed that he was simply looking for new 
political allies after he had alienated and lost a large segment of the 
Northerners.123 The Umma Party, DUP, and ICF perceived the Addis Ababa 
Agreement as a new major obstacle in the face of their Arab-Islamic vision of the 
Sudan. On the other hand, the leftists considered it as an unholy reactionary 
alliance against the liberal and socialist forces in the whole of the Sudan. 
Another major disconnect was that the South was, at least theoretically under 
the Addis Ababa Agreement, a democracy with free elections, freedom of 
expression and association, and rule of law, while the North was under an 
autocratic rule, with its constitution being Republican Order No. 5, issued by the 
Military Command Council (the army officers who led the May 25 coup). The 
 
121. Gamal Nkrumah, Al-Tijani Al-Tayeb: A Revolutionary Path, 707 AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ON-LINE 
(Sept. 9-15, 2004), http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/707/profile.htm. 
122. Elections in Sudan, AFRICAN ELECTIONS DATABASE, http://africanelections.tripod.com/ 
sd.html#1971_Presidential_Election (last updated Jan. 31, 2011). 
123. Along those lines, it was stated: 
Initially the Addis Ababa Agreement was viewed by most northern political leaders as sellout 
to the southerners by Nimeiri. Little did they realize that he was compelled by circumstances to 
do so and would be equally prepared to abandon it if circumstances so required. Indeed it was 
when Nimeiri no longer needed southern support that he realigned himself with the politico-
religious forces in the north and unilaterally abrogated the Addis Ababa Agreement in June 
1983. 
See Elias Nyamlell Wakoson, The Dilemmas of South North Conflict, in THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND UNITY IN 
THE SUDAN, supra note 69, at 90, 92. 
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Permanent Constitution of the Sudan, which was promulgated in 1973,124 
cemented the extensive powers of the President and the one-party rule. Thus, the 
opposition groups were either opposed to, or at best apathetic about, the Addis 
Ababa Agreement. 
However, Mr. Nimeiri did not need anyone else to undermine the Addis 
Ababa Agreement. He would soon start to do that by himself. He interfered with 
the appointment for the senior political positions and imposed his candidates 
from the early days of the Addis Ababa Agreement. He instructed Mr. Abel Alier 
to withdraw from nomination for President of the High Executive Council in 
1978, in favor of Mr. Joseph Lagu. The Speaker of the Regional Assembly, Mr. 
Clement Mboro, was removed in 1979, and he alleged that this was done at the 
instigation of Mr. Nimeiri. In October 1980, Mr. Nimeiri suddenly issued 
presidential orders dissolving the Regional Assembly and the High Executive 
Council. He replaced Mr. Lagu with Mr. Gismallah Rassas, a Southerner who 
lived in the North, and was mistaken as a Northerner, perhaps because of his 
name, by most Southerners. He also appointed the cabinet, as well as the 
commissioners of the Southern provinces. This was a gross violation of the Self-
Government Act of 1972, as the Act required that the appointment and dismissal 
of the President of the High Executive Council would be done by the President of 
the Republic on the recommendation of the Regional Assembly.125 Mr. Nimeiri 
justified his decisions on the need to create an environment conducive for a 
plebiscite he was contemplating on the division of the Southern Region into three 
regions. 
The idea of dividing the Southern Region into three separate regions 
(corresponding to the three Southern Provinces of Bahr el-Ghazal, Equatoria, and 
Upper Nile) started to emerge in the late 1970s. Some non-Dinka politicians, 
including Mr. Lagu himself, who was from the Madi tribe, thought it would do 
away with the domination of the Dinka politicians and intellectuals and allow 
wider participation of the smaller tribes in the South. Nimeiri thought it would 
give him more control of the South if the Southern region was divided into three 
separate regions. Although the Southern leaders opposed to the division of the 
South won the 1982 elections, their views were ignored, and they were harassed. 
In February 1983, the Speaker of the Regional Assembly, Mr. Mathew Obur, and 
the Vice President of the High Executive Council, Mr. Dhol Acuil, were arrested 
for speaking publicly against the proposed division. 
Division of the Southern Region into three regions required an amendment to 
the Self-Government Act of 1972, and any amendment to the Act required a two-
thirds majority of the Southern Sudanese voters.126 Yet, Mr. Nimeiri went ahead 
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and on June 5, 1983 issued Republican Order No. 1, establishing three regions in 
the place of the one region under the Self-Government Act. In addition to the 
principal change of establishing three regions, the Order transferred a good part 
of the authority of the regional government to the central government.127 
A number of other decisions taken by Mr. Nimeiri kept the anger of the 
Southerners rising. Oil was discovered in the South by Chevron Company, but a 
decision to build a refinery in Bentiu, where the oil was discovered, was 
reversed. The refinery would be built in Kosti, in the North, and the oil would be 
exported through Port Sudan. Those decisions simply meant to the Southerners 
that their oil would be refined, used in, and exported through the North. 
Plans for the construction of the Jonglei canal project in South Sudan were 
completed after the Addis Ababa Agreement was concluded, and the work started 
in the late-1970s. The canal would add about five billion cubic meters of the 
waters of the Sudd swamps of Southern Sudan to the Nile waters. The canal was 
planned under, and reference to it was included in, the 1959 Nile Agreement 
between Egypt and Sudan.128 Under the Agreement, Egypt and Sudan would 
share the cost of the project and the water conserved. The project was opposed by 
the Southerners, and seven people were killed in the demonstrations against the 
canal in 1976. The demonstrators saw the canal as another project harming the 
Southern environment and the local communities in the canal area, for the benefit 
of Northern Sudan and Egypt. For them it was the oil, and now the water, of the 
South, being transported for the benefit of the North. The situation quieted after 
promises of a number of development projects in the canal area, including an 
irrigation scheme, a sugar factory, roads, hospitals, schools, and bridges to allow 
movement of people and livestock across the two sides of the canal. However, by 
1983, the canal was two-thirds completed (260 kilometers out of the total canal 
length of 360 kilometers), and none of the promised development projects were 
started.129 
No movement took place with regards to the border issues between the North 
and the South that were raised during the Addis Ababa negotiations. The issue of 
the Abyei enclave was particularly important for the Southerners because it was 
the area where the Ngok Dinka tribe lived. The area had been transferred to the 
North in 1905 and became geographically part of the North. The Misseriya, a 
northern Arab tribe, shared part of the area with the Ngok Dinka and moved 
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held in the three Southern Provinces of the Sudan.” 
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during the dry season deep into the south of the Abyei area. Thus, the dispute 
involved not only the North and the South, but also the Ngok Dinka and the 
Misseriya tribes. 
The Addis Ababa Agreement defined the Southern Provinces of the Sudan to 
include “the Provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile in 
accordance with their boundaries as they stood January 1, 1956, and other areas 
that were culturally and geographically a part of the Southern Complex as may 
be decided by a referendum.”130 Although Abyei was not mentioned explicitly in 
this paragraph of the Addis Ababa Agreement, it was understood and agreed that 
“the other areas that were culturally and geographically part of the Southern 
Complex”131 referred to the Abyei area. Indeed, a presidential decree was issued 
in 1974 placing the Abyei area administratively under the presidency, but nothing 
was done to implement that decree. The referendum for the residents of the 
Abyei area to determine its future, referred to in the Addis Ababa Agreement, 
was all but forgotten by Khartoum.132 
Consequent to Republican Order No. 1, Mr. Nimeiri issued a decree 
dissolving the two institutions of regional autonomy in Southern Sudan—the 
Regional Assembly and the High Executive Council. This action washed away 
any doubts about the determination of Mr. Nimeiri to do away with the Addis 
Ababa Agreement. Even those who pushed for the division of the South, like Mr. 
Lagu, were alarmed, and realized that their demand was manipulated by Mr. 
Nimeiri. 
Following two attempted takeovers of power by the opposition in 1975 and 
1976, Mr. Nimeiri reconciled in 1978 with the three opposition Islamist parties 
(the Umma Party, DUP, and ICF, who worked together under an umbrella they 
called the “National Front”). As a result of the reconciliation, the three parties 
were represented in the government and the SSU organs. Mr. Al-Mahdi and the 
brother of Mr. Al-Mirghani were appointed as members of the Political Bureau 
of the Sudanese Socialist Union (the government and only party allowed in the 
Sudan). Mr. Al-Turabi became the Attorney General in Nimeiri’s government. 
All the talk by the National Front parties about democracy, freedom, human 
rights, and the rule of law was forgotten. As mentioned earlier, the leaders of the 
two sects had initially endorsed the takeover by General Abboud in November 
1958 that was orchestrated by the Prime Minister of the Umma Party. By 1978, 
the three parties of the National Front were an integral part and parcel of Mr. 
Nimeiri’s government and his political organs and structures. 
The National Front parties saw the Addis Ababa Agreement as an obstacle to 
their goal of an Arab-Islamic constitution and state. They argued that the 
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131. Id. art. 3(c). 
132. For a detailed account of the Abyei dispute, see John Young, John Garang’s Legacy to the Peace 
Process, the SPLM/A & the South, 106 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 535 (2005). 
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Agreement delegated to the South too much power. They endorsed the division 
of the South into three regions, believing that the step would weaken the South, 
as well as the regime, and make its manipulation, and even its overthrow, easier. 
On the other hand, Mr. Nimeiri naively believed that he had new allies in the 
North, and thus should no longer be concerned about the loss of his old allies in 
the South. 
There were problems regarding the absorption of the Southern Sudan 
Liberation Movement soldiers (called the Anya-nya) in the Sudanese army. Many 
soldiers felt they were not given the rank they deserved, and their Northern 
superiors did not treat them well. On March 2, 1975, the Okobo garrison 
mutinied, and seven Northern soldiers and ten Southerners were killed, and a 
number were wounded. Another garrison in Wau deserted in February 16, 1976 
and headed to the bush. Those mutinies and desertions kept repeating themselves 
in other garrisons in the South. 
Mr. John Garang was an army officer in the Anya-nya. He was absorbed in 
the Sudanese army after the Addis Ababa Agreement, and five years later was 
sent to the United States to do his doctorate degree.133 He completed his degree in 
1981, and returned to the Sudan that year. In May 1983, he deserted the Sudanese 
army where he held the rank of colonel, and joined the garrison that mutinied in 
Bor that month. The National Security Council ordered an attack on the Bor 
garrison on May 16, 1983. The attack succeeded in dispersing the garrison, but 
its soldiers regrouped near the Ethiopian borders. 
In July 1983, Mr. John Garang announced the birth of the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (“SPLA”),134 with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement 
(“SPLM”) as its political wing (collectively, the “SPLM/A”), and he emerged as 
the leader of both. The SPLM vision, as articulated in the Manifesto, was no 
longer confined to Southern Sudan. Rather, it was a national one based on the 
liberation of the whole of the Sudan and the establishment of a secular 
democratic state—the New Sudan. Paragraph III.I.3 of the Manifesto stated:  
Voluntary unity in the New Sudan is, therefore, conditioned on creating a 
political and socio-economic commonality that brings all the Sudanese 
together as equal citizens in rights and obligations. We must clearly 
move away from the parameters of the Old Sudan of racism, religious 
intolerance, historical myopia, and the associated economic collapse, 
 
133. Joseph Lagu claimed that Mr. Garang was opposed to the integration of the Any-nya units within the 
Sudanese army after the Addis Ababa Agreement, and that he decided to send Mr. Garang to the United States 
to do his doctorate degree so he would be away while the integration was being undertaken. See BOB, supra 
note 58, at 499.  
134. Young, supra note 132, at 535-48. 
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instability and wars. The Old Sudan has clearly taken us to a dead end, to 
the edge of the abyss.135  
Thus, the problem for the SPLM was no longer of Southern Sudan, but of the 
whole state. This was certainly a complete change from the program and vision 
of all the previous Southern movements and political parties. 
The SPLA started its military activities in South Sudan soon after its 
establishment. Two of its early targets were oil and water. By early 1984, both 
the Chevron oil operations and the Jonglei canal project were attacked by the 
SPLA and shut down.136 By that time, the second civil war had already engulfed 
Southern Sudan, and gradually, large areas of the South came under the control 
of the SPLA. It would soon extend to Northern areas close to the South, as well. 
As if the abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement was not enough, Mr. 
Nimeiri went further and made the job of Mr. Garang easier. In September 1983, 
four months after Mr. Garang started his movement, Mr. Nimeiri, who came to 
power with the help of the Communist and other leftist parties, discovered 
political Islam. In that month he decreed the application of Sharia law in the 
whole country (called “September Laws,” as the decree was issued in September 
1983).137 No doubt, the leaders of the National Front in Nimeiri’s government 
played a major role in the introduction of Sharia law. What they failed to achieve 
during the two civilian eras—the declaration of Sudan as an Islamic state—was 
now fully accomplished under Nimeiri’s military rule through one presidential 
decree. They pledged their allegiance to the newly born “leader of the faithful,” 
Imam Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri. The 1973 Constitution was amended to reflect 
the new Islamic character of the Sudan, and more of the September Laws were 
introduced. Harsh penalties, such as the amputation of hands of those convicted 
of petty theft, were carried out publicly. The declaration of the Islamic state and 
the introduction and application of the September Laws were the last nails in the 
coffin of the Addis Ababa Agreement. 
As a result of these developments, many Southerners in the army, civil 
service, and academic institutions flocked to join the new movement. The vision 
of the New Sudan attracted some Northern Sudanese as well, and soon the SPLA 
had Northerners fighting side-by-side with the Southerners against the Khartoum 
government. Furthermore, some Northerners gradually made it to senior 
positions in the SPLM, the political wing of the SPLA. 
 
135. See THE MANIFESTO OF THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT (2008), available at  
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By the mid-1980s, the economic situation and political oppression in the 
North worsened, and the civil war in the South that had just erupted intensified. 
Those factors, together with the introduction of the harsh September Laws and 
their discriminatory application, helped galvanize the opposition against 
Nimeiri’s regime. The regime was finally toppled through a popular uprising in 
April 1985.138 Mr. Nimeiri lost his old allies in the South, and his new ones in the 
North were happy to see him go, determined to replace him, and continue with 
his precious gift of the September Laws and the new Islamic state he declared 
and started to establish. That was Mr. Nimeiri’s fatal miscalculation. Worse, he 
went down in history as the leader who irresponsibly squandered a golden 
opportunity for the resolution, once and for all, of the problem of Southern 
Sudan—or perhaps we should say the problem of the Sudan. The enormous 
goodwill among the Southern Sudanese that ensued as the result of the Addis 
Ababa Agreement evaporated, and it was quite apparent that it would be very 
difficult, if not impossible, for the North to regain it any time again. 
F.  The Third Civilian Era 1985–1989: The Sudanese Peace Initiative 
The popular revolt that overthrew Mr. Nimeiri in April 1985 had a number of 
similarities with the one that overthrew General Abboud’s regime in October 
1964. The slogans of the October revolution—democracy, freedom, and 
resolution of the Southern problem—were resurrected, in addition to the 
abolition of the September Laws. History repeated itself, not only in the April 
revolt being similar to the October one, but also in the developments that 
followed and the terrible failure and disappointments of the third civilian era, 
which were similar to the second one. 
A civilian transitional government was formed after the overthrow of Mr. 
Nimeiri, headed by Mr. Al-Gizouli Dafallah, a medical doctor with clear Islamist 
leanings.139 The government consisted of technocrats, but the political parties 
were also represented. A Transitional Military Council (“TMC”) consisting of 
the leading army officers was appointed as a collective head of state. It was 
headed by an Islamist, Field Marshal Abdel Rahman Swar Al-Dahab, who was 
the Minister of Defense and General Commander of the armed forces in Mr. 
Nimeiri’s last government.140 In other words, he moved from the position of 
Minister of Defense in Mr. Nimeiri’s government, to chairman of the TMC that 
replaced Mr. Nimeiri. 
Like the transitional government that was established after the October 
revolution in 1964, it was an inept and ineffective government, and its 
transitional character made it even weaker. The 1973 Constitution, which Mr. 
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Nimeiri promulgated, was abolished, and the 1964 Transitional Constitution, 
which was based on the 1956 Transitional Constitution, was revived with some 
amendments and called the 1985 Transitional Constitution.141 It seems that the 
political leaders of the Sudan in that era felt embarrassed to call it the 1956 
Constitution, as amended in 1964, and amended again in 1985. Those three 
constitutions were based on the Self-Government Statute of 1953, tailored and 
retailored in the three instances, in quite a hurry, to meet the new political 
circumstances. Because of the political instability and movement between 
parliamentary and military governments, no permanent constitution was adopted 
during any of the three civilian eras, and the Sudan kept being governed by 
transitional constitutions. 
Despite the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution, Sudan remained as a rigid 
Islamic state because the September Laws had already converted Sudan into a 
theocratic state. As mentioned earlier, the September Laws were Nimeiri’s 
precious gift to the three Islamist parties. They failed twice during the two 
previous civilian eras to adopt an Islamic constitution or Islamic laws. Nimeiri 
did that, to their astonishment, overnight. They would hold on to it dearly, 
whether the Southerners and the secular elements in the North liked it or not. It 
would certainly guarantee their hold on power. 
Contacts between the transitional government and the SPLM took place, but 
did not lead anywhere. This was due largely to the lack of trust between the 
SPLM and the TMC. The SPLM saw the TMC as consisting of the very same 
army officers who planned and conducted the ruthless war in the South against 
the SPLM/A. The failure of the transitional government to abolish the September 
Laws was held by the SPLM against the transitional government and taken, 
together with the structure of the TMC, as signs of the continuation of Mr. 
Nimeiri’s policies. 
The contacts resulted in a meeting between the SPLM and representatives of 
the professional and trade unions that led the April revolt, as well as the Umma 
Party and the Communist Party. Those groups and parties came together after the 
April revolt under the banner of the National Alliance for National Salvation. 
The meeting took place in Koka Dam in Ethiopia in March 1986.142 The two 
parties deliberated on the problems of the Sudan for three days. On March 24, 
1986, the participants agreed on and issued the Koka Dam Declaration. The 
Declaration underscored the fact that the problem being faced was that of the 
Sudan and not Southern Sudan. It called for “[t]he lifting of the State of 
Emergency, [r]epeal of the ‘September 1983 Laws’ and all other laws that [were] 
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restrictive of freedoms, [a]doption of the 1956 Constitution as amended in 1964, 
with incorporation of ‘Regional Government,’ [and] [a]brogation of the military 
pacts . . . [that] impinge[d] on Sudan’s national sovereignty.” The Declaration 
also called for convening a national conference with the participation of all the 
political parties in the third week of June 1986.143 
The Koka Dam meeting and Declaration were hailed as a major step for 
peace in the Sudan. The participants were given a hero’s welcome upon arrival in 
Khartoum. Meetings started taking place for dissemination of the outcome of the 
Koka Dam meeting and for preparations for the national conference envisaged 
under the Declaration. However, a few days after the Declaration was issued, the 
Umma Party announced its reservations about some of the recommendations of 
the Koka Dam Declaration, particularly the abolition of the September Laws. 
Moreover, the Transitional Military Council, the collective head of state during 
the transitional period, was not enthusiastic about the Koka Dam Declaration 
either.144 In fact the TMC was accused of undermining the Koka Dam process.145 
Since the DUP was not a party to the Koka Dam Declaration, and the TMC was 
not enthusiastic about it, the withdrawal of the Umma Party effectively meant the 
end of the Koka Dam process. 
Elections took place in April 1986, and another Umma-DUP coalition 
government under Mr. Sadig Al-Mahdi was formed soon after.146 Mr. Al-Mahdi 
would remain Prime Minister until June 1989, the longest civilian politician to 
serve in that position during a civilian era.147 Yet, there was not much positive to 
show for his tenure. As in the second civilian era, the DUP got the permanent 
presidency of the Supreme Council of State. Mr. Ahmed Al-Mirghani, the 
brother of the DUP leader, was chosen for that position as the quid pro quo for 
Mr. Al-Mahdi getting the premiership. Clearly, the more things changed in the 
political scene in the Sudan, the more they remained the same.148 
 
143. For the Koka Dam Declaration, see Koka Dam Declaration (A Proposed Programme for National 
Action), in THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND UNITY IN THE SUDAN, supra note 69, at 24, 24-26. The Declaration is 
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144. See Lam Akol Ajawin, The Present War and its Solution, in THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND UNITY IN 
THE SUDAN, supra note 69, at 15, 21-22. 
145. In the letters Mr. John Garang exchanged with the Prime Minister of the Transitional Government, 
Mr. El-Gizouli Dafalla, Mr. Garang pointed out repeatedly that the army officers of the TMC were the ones 
who ran the military campaign in Southern Sudan during Nimeiri’s era. He quoted a number of examples of the 
military campaign they were conducting in the South when they were in the TMC. For those letters, see JOHN 
GARANG, THE CALL FOR DEMOCRACY IN SUDAN 85-100 (Mansour Khalid eds., 2d ed. 1992). 
146. HOLT & DALY, supra note 25, at 182. 
147. Id. at 185. 
148. It is worth adding in this connection that in December 2011, one of the sons of Mr. Sadig Al-Mahdi, 
and one of the sons of Mr. Mohamed Osman Al-Mirghani, were both appointed as assistants to President Omer 
Al-Bashir, a move that was met with a lot of sarcasm among the Sudanese people. See Sons of Sudan’s 
Opposition Leaders Appointed as Bashir’s Aides, SUDAN TRIBUNE (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.sudantribune. 
com/Sons-of-Sudan-s-opposition-leaders,40858. 
[1] SALMAN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 7/22/2013 4:13 PM 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 26 
375 
Following the elections and formation of the government, a meeting was held 
between Mr. Garang and Mr. Al-Mahdi in Addis Ababa. Mr. Garang insisted on 
the abolition of the September Laws, which Mr. Al-Mahdi was not willing to do. 
Mr. Garang argued for a secular democratic state, while Mr. Al-Mahdi stood for 
an Arab-Islamic one. Mr. Garang wanted a balanced foreign policy that would 
look at both Africa and the Arab world, and insisted on Sudan abrogating its 
military pacts with Egypt, while Mr. Al-Mahdi emphasized the Arabic allegiance 
of the Sudan. The meeting ended without an agreement on any of the issues 
facing the country. Indeed, each of the two leaders had his own philosophy and 
agenda, and the rivalry between them for leadership of the Sudan was evident, 
and it dominated their entire relationship. The letters they would exchange in the 
1990s revealed the deep distrust and misgivings they harbored about each other, 
as well as the sharp ideological differences between them. The civil war 
intensified and was carried briefly to the North, where the SPLA occupied the 
Kurmuk town for a while, close to the borders with Ethiopia. 
On November 16, 1988, Mr. Mohamed Osman Al-Mirghani, leader of the 
DUP, and Mr. John Garang met in Addis Ababa and, after one long day of 
discussion, concluded an agreement that was known as the Sudanese Peace 
Initiative.149 The agreement called for holding a constitutional conference to 
discuss the problem of the Sudan (not Southern Sudan).150 The conference would 
be held no later than December 31, 1988, and would be preceded by certain 
measures, including the freezing of the application of the September Laws (and 
not their abolition), a ceasefire, and lifting the state of emergency.151 This 
framework agreement was certainly a major positive development and reflected 
some flexibility on the part of Mr. Garang. It was welcomed by most political 
groups and trade unions in Khartoum, and Mr. Al-Mirghani received a hero’s 
welcome upon return to Khartoum. 
However, the Prime Minister, Mr. Al-Mahdi, dragged his feet. He was not 
willing or able to freeze application of Islamic law. His allies in the CIF, by then 
renamed themselves as the National Islamic Front (“NIF”), mobilized their 
members and organized rallies and a vicious campaign against the agreement. 
Moreover, neither Mr. Al-Mahdi, nor Mr. Al-Turabi wanted the credit for ending 
the civil war to go to their rival, Mr. Al-Mirghani. They questioned the motives 
of the DUP and reminded the Sudanese people that the DUP was not a party to 
the Koka Dam meeting or Declaration. That was part of the truth because the NIF 
was not a party to Koka Dam either, and the Umma Party announced its 
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reservations about the Declaration after it initially agreed to it, and later opposed 
it. Meanwhile, the economic situation worsened with the scarcity of basic 
commodities and mounting inflation. The civil war escalated and dragged on. 
The inept government of Mr. Al-Mahdi was overthrown by a military coup 
on June 30, 1989.152 Like the two previous military takeovers, the Prime Minister 
whose government was overthrown belonged to the Umma Party. Clearly the 
Umma Party did not learn from the past two coup d’etats. Sudan kept running in 
the vicious cycle of coups and popular revolts. The Sudanese Peace Initiative was 
a promising opportunity for ending the civil war, but was plundered by political 
rivalries, the indecisiveness of the Prime Minister, and his manipulation by the 
NIF. Thus, two more opportunities for ending the civil war—the Koka Dam 
Declaration and the Sudan Peace Initiative—were both lost, dragging the country 
deeper into an unwinnable war, and exacerbating the human, social, and 
economic misery of the nation. 
G. The Third Military Rule: 1989–Present: The Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement 
The June 30, 1989 military coup was masterminded by the National Islamic 
Front, the allies of the Prime Minister, Mr. Sadiq Al-Mahdi. Like the previous 
two military coups, it started with banning political parties and organizations, 
jailing their leaders, and confiscating their properties. The NIF soon embarked on 
harsh measures of mass arrests, torture, and extensive purge of the civil service 
of people whose loyalty was not assured.153 Execution of twenty-eight army 
officers accused of plotting to overthrow the government took place in the last 
week of Ramadan in 1990 and was a clear indication of the extent the NIF 
government would go to assert its authority to scare and subdue its opponents. 
Although Brigadier Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir announced that he was the 
head of the military command council that took over, the real powers were in the 
hands of Mr. Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of the NIF. After all, the coup was 
planned and executed by the NIF. 
The civil war was escalated by the new regime, and the goal was no longer to 
re-establish law and order and end the mutiny of the Southerners.154 Rather, it was 
called Jihad, a holy war against the infidels in the South.155 It aimed at spreading 
Islam and extending the Islamic state in the South, and through the South into 
equatorial Africa. Northern soldiers and members of the newly-formed popular 
defense forces were given a free hand in conducting the war. Their members who 
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were killed in combat in Southern Sudan were declared martyrs, who would go 
straight to heaven, announced the government. Martyrs’ weddings and 
celebrations, led in most occasions by Mr. al-Turabi himself and absurd as they 
may have been, were held for those killed in the South. Main streets and halls 
were named after the leaders of the NIF who were killed in the South. All sorts of 
opposition to the war and the government were harshly silenced, and it was 
declared that no voice would be louder than that of Jihad. 
Despite escalation of the war, secret and open contacts and meetings between 
the NIF government and the SPLM/A took place and continued. A number of 
initiatives were offered by Sudan’s neighboring countries and some regional and 
international organizations to mediate an end to the war. Some of those 
initiatives, and the declarations and agreements resulting therefrom, will be 
reviewed and analyzed in the course of this Article. As will be discussed in more 
detail below, those initiatives and declarations led, thirteen years after the NIF 
took over power, to the conclusion of the Machakos Protocol granting South 
Sudan the right of self-determination with the option of unity or secession on 
July 20, 2002. Two and half years later, on January 9, 2005, the two parties 
concluded the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.156 In addition to the Machakos 
Protocol, the CPA included five other agreements and protocols, as will be 
discussed later.157 
However, before delving into the details of those protocols and agreements 
and how they were negotiated and concluded, it is important to discuss one 
significant development within the ruling NIF in the Sudan. The development 
was the major split within the ruling NIF in 1999 and the end of the rule of Mr. 
al-Turabi.158 As a result of the split, the NIF broke into two parties: the National 
Congress Party (“NCP”) of President Omar al-Bashir, and the Popular Congress 
Party (“PCP”) of Mr. Hassan al-Turabi. The differences that led to the split were 
not ideological; rather, they centered on who would be the absolute ruler of the 
country. The demise of Mr. al-Turabi’s rule seemed to have played a role in 
ending the civil war in the Sudan, as he was the political ideologue of the NIF 
regime and the real power behind the throne. Moreover, Mr. al-Bashir and his 
group might have decided they could not afford to fight in two fronts, one against 
Mr. Garang, and the other against Mr. al-Turabi. 
It should, however, also be added that the conclusion of the CPA was a result 
of the realization by both parties, particularly the NIF, and later the NCP 
government, that, after thirteen years of heavy military combat, the civil war was 
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simply not winnable. The cost in human life and fiscal resources was no longer 
affordable by the government, which was facing increasing isolation and was 
under heavy pressure from the United States and West European countries. The 
economic situation worsened during the first ten years of NIF rule, with the 
Sudanese pound losing more than ninety percent of its value. The discovery of oil 
in Southern Sudan and the start of its development and export through the 
pipeline that flows through large areas of the South was a huge incentive for the 
NCP to end the war. The NCP knew very well that oil could only be extracted 
and exported, and oil companies would only operate, in a peaceful environment. 
Everyone remembered the attacks on Chevron by the SPLA in 1984. Moreover, 
the strategy of the NIF, and later the NCP, of weakening the SPLM by 
concluding agreements with the SPLM splinter groups, supporting them, and 
giving them a share in power, did not work, as will be discussed later. 
By 2002, the NCP government was forced by the above factors, as well as 
international pressure, to enter into serious negotiations with the SPLM. Shortly 
after the conclusion of the Machakos Protocol on July 2002, the first agreement 
under the CPA, the government started to gradually abandon the calls for Jihad 
and the absurd martyrs’ weddings. By that time, the NCP had forgotten about the 
contention that even regional autonomy for the South would stand in the way of 
the Arab-Islamic state in Sudan. It also closed its eyes to the forty years of its 
persistent refusal to acknowledge the different cultural, ethnic, religious, and 
linguistic characteristics of the South. By 2005, the South was no longer a 
vacuum to be necessarily filled by Arab culture under an Islamic revival, as Mr. 
al-Turabi announced in 1967.159 Rather, the Southerners were regarded as a 
distinct people with a distinct culture, and equal constituents and partners that 
were entitled to the full rights of self-determination.160 
After lengthy and complex negotiations that spanned almost three years in 
Kenya, under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(“IGAD”) and the government of Kenya, the government of the Republic of the 
Sudan and the SPLM/A signed, on January 9, 2005, the CPA.161 The CPA was 
painstakingly and incrementally negotiated during those three years and 
incorporated a number of separate protocols and agreements. This was a defining 
moment in the history of Sudan. The CPA ended a devastating civil war that had 
lasted since 1983 following the collapse of the Addis Ababa Agreement, as 
discussed earlier. It put in place radical new political structures for the division of 
power and wealth between the two parts of the country during an interim period 
of six years. More importantly, the CPA recognized for the first time the right of 
the people of Southern Sudan to self-determination with the option of secession. 
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Before reviewing the agreements and protocols under the CPA, it is essential 
to trace the route that the SPLM followed to attain the right of self-determination 
and to succeed in implanting it as the main component of the first protocol under 
the CPA, essentially hoisting it as the flagship of the CPA and the Interim 
Constitution. The road to self-determination was a long and difficult one, but was 
shrewdly and intelligently negotiated by the SPLM for over more than a decade, 
with both the NIF/NCP government in Khartoum and the opposition National 
Democratic Alliance (“NDA”) political parties and trade unions in Sudan’s 
neighboring countries. The road was over-laid with guns and diplomacy, and was 
coated all the way through by the broken promises the North made to the South 
since 1947, when Northern political leaders met their Southern counterparts for 
the first time ever during the Juba Conference.162 
IV. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR 
SOUTH SUDAN 
A. The SPLM Shift to the Right of Self-Determination 
Two immediate questions may jump to the mind of the reader when reaching 
this point of the history of modern Sudan. The first question relates to the right of 
self-determination and how it emerged and became the flagship of the CPA. The 
second question is how the government and the political parties that fought for 
fifty years to deny a large segment of its population even limited regional 
autonomy could suddenly agree to grant that same segment the right of self-
determination with the option of secession. 
As discussed earlier, the first time the issue of self-determination for 
Southern Sudan was formally raised was during the preparations for the 
roundtable conference in 1965. During the conference, some of the Southern 
Sudanese leaders wanted to bring to the table for discussion the issue of the right 
of Southern Sudan to self-determination. However, this demand was vehemently 
rejected by the Northern parties, and was not pursued by the Southerners. 
Instead, some of the Southern leaders, led by Mr. William Deng,163 reverted to 
their original demand of federation, which was also and again rejected by the 
Northern parties. The issue of the right of self-determination was not raised again 
for the next twenty-five years. Even during the Addis Ababa negotiations, the 
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issue on the table was federation, which was later diluted to regional autonomy 
and self-government, as reflected in the Addis Ababa Agreement.164 
Although the SPLM/A declared and pronounced in its Manifesto in 1983 that 
it was fighting for a secular democratic united state, the New Sudan, the quest for 
self-determination suddenly found its way into its menu of demands in 1991.165 In 
September of that year, the SPLM/A held a meeting of its Political Military High 
Command in the town of Torit in Southern Sudan, which was under their control 
at the time. The meeting took place one month after a splinter group, led by Mr. 
Riek Machar and Mr. Lam Akol Ajawin, broke away from the SPLM in August 
of 1991, and established a separate liberation movement. The Machar/Akol 
movement was referred to as the “Nasir Group,” in reference to the city of Nasir 
in the Upper Nile province in Southern Sudan, where the Shilluk tribe (Mr. 
Akol’s tribe) lived. 
The Torit meeting was held despite, or perhaps because of, those divisions 
within the SPLM. The meeting issued a number of resolutions, totaling eighteen 
and dealing with a wide range of issues (referred to as the “Torit Resolutions”). 
Resolution 1 dealt with what it called “The Riak/Lam theoretical coup of 
28/8/1991.” It denounced and condemned the coup as divisive and destructive, 
but it stated that the situation would be approached peacefully, and an amicable 
solution sought. Resolution 3 on the “Current Peace Initiatives” enumerated such 
peace initiatives since the birth of the SPLM. It listed the Koka Dam Declaration 
of 1986, the agreement with the Sudan African Parties in 1987, and the Sudanese 
Peace Initiative with the DUP in 1988. It indicated that the SPLM entered into 
peace talks with the Khartoum junta in 1989 and confirmed the intentions of the 
SPLM to continue to actively seek peaceful resolution with the government in 
Khartoum and the other political forces. 
Resolution 3.2 was the most important of all the Torit resolutions. It began 
by noting that “a centralized system of government in the Sudan based on 
Arabism and Islam with local autonomies or federal states granted to the South 
(or other Regions) has been tried, failed, or discredited, and thus the country has 
oscillated between war and peace since independence.”166 Resolution 3.2 went on 
to chart the future negotiation strategy of the SPLM. It stated that “in any future 
peace initiatives and talks, the position of the SPLM/SPLA on the system of 
[g]overnment shall be based on resolving the war through a united secular 
democratic Sudan, confederation, association of sovereign states or self 
determination.”167 
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This was certainly a milestone and a bombshell. The slogan of the unified 
“New Sudan” pronounced eight years earlier was no longer the only SPLM 
agenda item, or its pivotal principle.168 It was rivaled by the squarely 
contradictory demand of self-determination with the option of secession.169 
Moreover, even a federal system under a central authority based on an Arab-
Islamic system was no longer an option for the SPLM. Thus, the long-standing 
quest of the Southerners for federation, which dated back to the early 1950s, had 
suddenly ended by 1991.170 Henceforth, the right of self-determination for 
Southern Sudan would dominate the political campaign, agenda, and activities of 
the SPLM, raising serious doubts about its commitment to the united New Sudan, 
pronounced eight years earlier under its 1983 Manifesto. 
What prompted this change in the strategy and program of the SPLM/A? 
Could the fall of the autocratic regime of Mr. Mengistu Haile-Mariam in 
Ethiopia, in May of 1991, be a reason for this change? After the attack on the Bor 
Garrison by the government army in May of 1983, Colonel Garang retreated to 
the border areas with Ethiopia and soon established his military base there.171 
Mr. Haile-Mariam welcomed the SPLM/A in Ethiopia and provided massive 
military and logistic support to the SPLM/A and became their closest ally. This 
was a golden opportunity for him to avenge the huge support Sudan provided to 
the Eritrean movements since the 1960s. Clearly, he was determined to use the 
opportunity effectively. In  this connection, many have argued that it was 
unthinkable for the SPLM/A to demand separation from Sudan, or even self-
determination, and expect help from Mr. Haile-Mariam, because Mr. Haile-
Mariam was fighting a similar war and facing similar demands for separation by 
the Eritreans.172 According to this line of thinking, Mr. Garang had to appear and 
act as a unionist to guarantee the continuation of Ethiopia’s military and logistic 
support.173 However, the fall of the regime of Mr. Mengistu Haile-Mariam, in 
May of 1991, cleared the way for the SPLM to raise, four months later in the 
Torit meeting, the issue of self-determination, including secession. After all, 
Eritrea itself was on its way to independence after its liberation movement 
extracted the right to self-determination in 1991 from the government that 
toppled Mr. Haile-Mariam and, after the movement swept Asmara, the capitol of 
Eritrea. 
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The SPLM’s path to self-determination was not an easy one, however, and it 
was paved with legal and political hurdles. One such major hurdle was the early 
resolution of the Organization of African Unity (“OAU”) which mandated that 
the borders between African states inherited from the colonial era were 
sacrosanct.174 The OAU declared in their resolution, in July of 1964, that “all 
Member States pledge themselves to respect the frontiers existing on their 
achievement of national independence.”175 In essence, the resolution reconfirmed 
the principle of stability of borders, the key element of uti possidetis, which 
ensured that the colonial borders stayed without change. 
Thus, the OAU resolution made it clear that secessionist movements would 
not be recognized or tolerated. For example, the quest of Biafra to break away 
from Nigeria and become an independent nation through the gun in the 1960s 
was crushed by Nigeria, as well as by the refusal of almost all the African states 
to recognize Biafra, in deference to the OAU resolution, and because of fear of 
their own “Biafras.” Southern Sudan was no exception, and its leaders knew that. 
Indeed, this might have been the reason why its leaders were content until the 
early 1990s with their demand for federation, rather than secession or even 
confederation. 
Eritrea was the only country before South Sudan to break away from another 
country in post-colonial Africa. However, Eritrea had a different history. The 
British administered the territory under a UN mandate until 1951, when Eritrea 
was federated with Ethiopia per a UN General Assembly resolution.176 Ethiopia, 
however, breached that status, and annexed Eritrea as its 14th province in 1952, 
in blatant defiance of the UN resolution, and immediately thereafter embarked on 
aggressive and harsh integrationist measures. That gave Eritrea’s case a special 
legal and political distinction. 
However, the OAU resolution does not prevent any government from 
granting the right of self-determination to any of its distinct groups or regions by 
agreement. The right of self-determination under this scenario would be a treaty-
based one and would not contradict the OAU resolution. Indeed, the quest of the 
Eritreans for self-determination was made easier through recognition of that right 
by the new government in Addis Ababa in May 1991.177 This was the strategic 
route the SPLM/A shrewdly decided to take. With promises being broken and 
 
174. Lydia Polgreen, For Rebels in Mali, Odds of Establishing a Nation Are Slim, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/07/world/africa/mali-rebels-declare-independence-but-face-an-uphill-
task.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print. 
175. See Resolution on the Intangibility of Frontiers, 1st Sess., July 17-21, 1964, O.A.U. Res. at 16(1), 
available at http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ASSEMBLY_EN_17_21_JULY_1964_ASSEMBLY_ 
HEADS_STATE_GOVERNMENT_FIRST_ORDINARY_SESSION.pdf. This Resolution is also reprinted in 
DOCUMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY 49 (Gino J. Naldi ed., 1992). 
176. G.A. Res 390A(V), 5th Sess., U.N. Soc. A/RES 390A(V) (Dec. 15, 1990). 
177. Gilbert A. Lewthwaight, Eritreans Declare Autonomy from Addis Ababa, BALTIMORE SUN (May 30, 
1991), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-05-30/news/1991150049_1_addis-ababa-ethiopian-people-revolu 
tionary-eprdf. 
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agreements being dishonored one after the other, the Southerners had to 
reconsider their strategy. Would a demand for self-determination find any 
support anywhere? Could it be negotiated with the Khartoum government and the 
Northern opposition political parties? Apparently the SPLM decided to give it a 
try, and strangely enough, and perhaps to the surprise of its leaders and members, 
they succeeded incrementally over a period of time. 
B. The Government of Sudan Acceptance of the Right of Self-Determination 
The NIF government decided to jump the self-determination wagon a few 
months after the SPLM Torit meeting. In January of 1992, four months after the 
Torit meeting, the government of the Sudan, represented by Mr. Ali Al-Haj, a 
leading member of the NIF, met in Frankfurt, Germany, with Dr. Lam Akol 
Ajawin, who had just broken ranks with the SPLM/A in August 1991, a month 
before the Torit meeting. The Frankfurt meeting took place from January 23 to 
25, 1992, and the two parties concluded the Frankfurt Agreement (also referred 
to as the Frankfurt Declaration, or Joint Statement). The Agreement is short, 
consisting of only four paragraphs. The first paragraph stated that there would be 
a transitional period, to be agreed upon, “during which Southern Sudan shall 
enjoy a special Constitutional and Political Status within the unified Sudan.”178 
After that period, “the people of the South shall exercise their right to freely 
choose the political and constitutional status that accords with their national 
aspirations, without ruling out any option.”179 The second paragraph indicated the 
agreement of the two parties to establish constitutional and legal rules for 
resolving differences through the political and constitutional institutions. The 
remaining paragraphs dealt with agreement of the parties for continuation of the 
negotiations in Abuja, Nigeria, at the earliest possible time. The negotiations 
would be preceded with a ceasefire and would address the system of government 
during the transitional period, sharing of power and wealth, as well as security 
arrangements, and the return and resettlement of the refugees.180 
The Frankfurt Agreement was no doubt an electrifying agreement; it was the 
first time ever that any Northern political party or government in Khartoum 
recognized the right of self-determination for the people of South Sudan. The fact 
that no option was excluded simply meant that the Frankfurt Agreement 
recognized the right of the Southern Sudanese to self-determination with all 
options available, including the option of secession. 
 
178. GARANG, supra note 145, at 292. 
179. For the Frankfurt Agreement, see AL-TAHIR HASSAN AL-TOM & DR. LAM AKOL AJAWIN—MY 
JOURNEY WITH THE SPLM 219 (2011) (in Arabic) (emphasis added). See also GARANG, supra note 145, at 292.  
180. The Abuja meetings took place during 1992 and 1993 between the Government of Sudan and the 
two groups of the SPLM, but there was no breakthrough on any of the issues tabled for discussion. For a 
detailed discussion of the Abuja meetings, see WONDU & LESCH, supra note 149. 
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It is quite ironic that recognition of this right came from the very same 
political group that three years earlier objected vehemently, through huge rallies 
and demonstrations, to the Sudanese Peace Initiative of November 1988, which 
did not include either a reference to self-determination for Southern Sudan, nor to 
secession. Indeed, the 1989 NIF coup d’etat was justified by the inability of the 
third civilian government to fight the war in the South and to maintain the unity 
and integrity of the Sudan. This complete change by the NIF of its position has 
since been quite puzzling, not only to observers, but to many members of the NIF 
and now the NCP itself. 
In my view, the NIF leaders thought that granting the right of self-
determination to the SPLM splinter group, led by Mr. Lam Akol, would 
strengthen that group and would make it look more capable of extracting 
concessions from the government than the mother movement led by Mr. John 
Garang. It should be pointed out that Mr. Garang belonged to the Dinka tribe, 
while Mr. Akol belonged to the Shiluk tribe. Strengthening the hands of Mr. 
Akol would mean widening the rifts between the two rival tribes, as well as the 
two leading politicians. Indeed, as will be discussed later, the government would 
soon conclude a similar agreement with Mr. Riek Machar of the Nuer tribe. 
Clearly, the strategy of the government was to present the SPLM as a Dinka-
based movement and to support and strengthen the other two largest and 
competing tribes with the Dinka in the South—the Nuer and the Shiluk—and 
thus widen the rift between them, and, in the process, weaken the main SPLM/A. 
In other words, it was a divide-and-rule strategy. As may be recalled, President 
Nimeiri tried that when he re-divided the South into three regions in 1983.181 
As a result of the Frankfurt Agreement, the psychological and political 
barriers against self-determination for the South had finally been broken. 
Henceforth, the rivalry between the government and the opposition would 
revolve, inter alia, around recognition of this right for the people of Southern 
Sudan. As it turned out, the decade of the 1990s can be viewed as the decade 
when the right of self-determination for Southern Sudan received wide 
acceptance and recognition by the Sudanese government and the opposition 
parties and trade unions, as well as the neighbors of the Sudan and the United 
States. 
In fact, the right of self-determination would prove to be a unifying element 
for the splinter groups within the SPLM. In an attempt to reunite those groups, 
the U.S. administration called for a meeting in Washington, D.C. in October 
1993. The meeting was attended by the SPLM, led by Mr. John Garang; the 
splinter groups of the SPLM, led by Mr. Riek Machar and Mr. Lam Akol; and 
representatives of the Northern opposition groups under the umbrella of the 
National Democratic Alliance. Although the two SPLM groups failed to agree on 
 
181. The Root Causes of Conflict in South Sudan, SOUTHSUDAN.NET, http://southsudan.net/theroot.html 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2013). 
[1] SALMAN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 7/22/2013 4:13 PM 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 26 
385 
a joint declaration to be issued on their reunification, each of them signed a 
separate statement that included a reference to the right of self-determination for 
Southern Sudan as the means for ending the conflict in the Sudan.182 The overlap 
of views on the right of self-determination for Southern Sudan made it easier for 
Mr. Riek Machar, and later Mr. Lam Akol, to return to the SPLM/A a few years 
later. By 1993, they all had one and the same goal: resolution of the North-South 
conflict through self-determination for the Southern Sudanese with the option of 
secession. 
The SPLM decided to give the demand for self-determination its full legal, 
constitutional, and political cover. It called for a national conference of the 
SPLM, which took place during the first week in April of 1994 in Shagdom in 
East Equatoria state, in South Sudan. The conference endorsed the right of self-
determination for the three provinces of Southern Sudan, in addition to the Abyei 
area, South Kodofan, and Blue Nile states in the North.183 Thus, the conference 
went beyond the decisions of the Torit meeting in September 1991 that limited 
the demand for the right of self-determination to Southern Sudan with its borders 
as they stood on independence on January 1956. 
Building on the Frankfurt agreement and the Washington statements, the 
IGAD countries,184 which were then involved in the South Sudan problem 
following the failure of the Abuja meetings, prepared, after two meetings with 
the two parties in March and May of 1994, the draft Declaration of Principles on 
the Conflict in the Sudan. The draft was completed in Nairobi on July 20, 1994 
and presented to the government of Sudan and the SPLM.185 The IGAD 
Declaration stated that “the right of self-determination of the people of South 
Sudan to determine their future status through a referendum must be affirmed.”186 
 
182. The meeting took place at the initiative of U.S. Congressman Harry Johnson, who later became the 
U.S. Special Envoy to the Sudan. For details on the Washington meeting, see JOHN G. NYUOT YOH, PEACE 
INITIATIVES IN SUDAN AND LESSONS LEARNED (1984-2002) (2004), available at http://www.johngaiyoh.com/ 
pdf/Peace%20Initiatives%20in%20Sudan%20and%20Lessons%20Learned.pdf?PHPSESSID=putki848kn70foi
qpbs8po9gp1. See also BOB, supra note 58, at 379. 
183. For more details on the Shagdom (also spelt as Chukudum) Conference, see FATHI ALDAW, SUDAN: 
THE FALL OF THE MASKS 242 (2006) (in Arabic). See also Young, supra note 132, at 541. Shagdom was under 
the control of the SPLM/A at that time. 
184. IGAD is an inter-governmental organization consisting of Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, Somalia, 
Ethiopia and the Sudan. Eritrea joined IGAD after it emerged as an independent nation in 1993. See IGAD, 
http://www.igad.org (last visited Mar. 27, 2013). 
185. ALEX DE WAAL ET AL., PEACE BY PIECE, ADDRESSING SUDAN’S CONFLICTS 78-81 (2006), available 
at http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/Accord18_26Keytextsandagreements_2006_ENG.pdf. 
186. For the IGAD Declaration of Principles on the Conflict in the Sudan, see The 1993 Abuja 2 
Sudanese Peace Conference: The IGAD Declaration of Principles (May 20, 1994), UNITED NATIONS 
PEACEMAKER,http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_940520_The%20IGAD%20Declarati
on%20of%20principles.pdf. It should be added that the Declaration also stated that “[e]xtensive rights of self-
determination on the basis of federation, autonomy, etc., to the various peoples of the Sudan must be affirmed.” 
Members of the IGAD decided to intervene and offer their good offices in 1994, after the failure of the Abuja 
negotiations that took place in 1992-1993; see supra text accompanying note 82. Thus, the problems of the 
Sudan moved from West Africa to East Africa in 1994. 
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The government of Sudan formally rejected the IGAD Declaration in September 
of 1994; however, it agreed later in 1997 that the Declaration would form the 
basis for negotiations with the SPLM.187 
These developments seemed to resonate well within the U.S. administration 
itself, and the right of self-determination for Southern Sudan got a major boost on 
August 4, 1994, eight months after the Washington meeting. On that day, a U.S. 
House of Representatives resolution condemned Sudan for its support of 
international terrorism and also recognized the right of self-determination for the 
Southern Sudanese people.188 Meanwhile, articles started appearing in academic 
journals arguing that the Southern Sudanese were distinct people who were 
entitled to the right of self-determination under international law.189 
C.  The Northern Opposition Parties and the Right of Self-Determination 
With the government of Sudan agreeing to the right of self-determination for 
Southern Sudan in Frankfurt in 1992, and the IGAD issuing its Declaration in 
1994, the SPLM soon started to discuss and tried to persuade the Sudanese 
political parties to endorse this demand. It should be noted that representatives of 
those parties attended the Washington meeting in October of 1993, where both 
groups of the SPLM agreed, in separate statements, on the right of self-
determination. The opposition parties clearly took note of this development and 
prepared for what was to come and what to expect. The DUP was the first 
Northern Sudanese party to recognize the right of self-determination for Southern 
Sudan. This may be due to the close ties between Mr. Garang and Mr. Al-
Mirghani. As may be recalled, the two leaders met in Addis Ababa in November 
of 1988 and concluded the Sudan Peace Initiative. Recognition of the right of 
self-determination for the South was the highlight of the Cairo Agreement 
concluded by the DUP, represented by Mr. Ahmed Al-Sayyed Hamad, and the 
SPLM, represented by Mr. Yousif Kuwa Mekki, in Cairo on July 13, 1994.190 
As expected, the Cairo Agreement underscored the close and special 
relationship between the DUP and the SPLM and highlighted the conclusion by 
the two parties of the Sudanese Peace Initiative. The Agreement, consisting of 
seven points, underscored the need to maintain the unity of the Sudan, and 
emphasized that the problems of the Sudan could only be resolved by dialogue. 
The Agreement then laid down a number of principles that would be included in 
the next constitution of the Sudan: the international covenants and conventions 
on human rights would be considered part of the national laws, and any law that 
 
187. DE WAAL ET AL., supra note 185, at 78-81. 
188. See House Approves Measure Against Sudan, REUTERS (Aug. 4, 1994); see also Angela M. Lloyd, 
The Southern Sudan, A Compelling Case for Secession, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 419 (1994). 
189. In this connection, see Lloyd, supra note 188. 
190. Copy of the Cairo Agreement is on file with the author. 
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is inconsistent with any of them would be null and void; equality of all Sudanese 
before the law regardless of religion, race, or culture; implementation of 
decentralization or a regional autonomy system of government in the different 
regions of the Sudan; and ensuring a fair and equitable division of wealth 
between the different regions of the Sudan. The Agreement went on to state, in 
Article 6, that if a violation of any of the principles agreed upon during the 
constitutional conference occurred, then the aggrieved party would have the right 
of self-determination through a referendum, and the results of such a referendum 
would be binding on the parties. Article 8 confirmed that the IGAD Declaration 
represented a positive step, which reflected the attention of the neighboring 
countries to the problems of the Sudan and underscored the need to give priority 
to the unity of the Sudan. The Agreement ended with a call to the Sudanese 
people to support the principles set forth in the Agreement. 
It is noteworthy that the Cairo Agreement followed a convoluted path in 
arriving at the right of self-determination. It conditioned the right of self-
determination for Southern Sudan on the failure of the Northern political parties 
to meet the obligations agreed upon in the constitutional conference that would 
be held to discuss the Sudan problem. This is a very interesting stipulation and 
was quite reflective of the promises, agreements, and declarations that were 
dishonored by the North. The Cairo Agreement also endorsed the IGAD 
Declaration of Principles, an implied but obvious reference to the right of self-
determination for South Sudan, which was the main element of the Declaration. 
With this agreement, the DUP became the first Sudanese political party to 
recognize the right of self-determination for South Sudan. Although the right of 
self-determination was qualified, the Cairo Agreement was no doubt a major 
breakthrough for the SPLM and was the equivalent of the Frankfurt Agreement. 
Each represented a major threshold in the history of the North-South relations. 
The rivalry between the two political parties in the Sudan, the Umma and the 
DUP, would now be played out in regards to their relationship with the SPLM. 
The Umma Party, it seemed, decided that it would not allow the DUP to 
outmaneuver it politically, even on issues concerning the possibility of the 
breakup of the Sudan. Five months after the Cairo Agreement, the Umma Party, 
represented by Mr. Omer Nour Al-Daiem, the Secretary-General of the Party, 
signed an agreement with the SPLM, represented by Mr. Salva Kiir, in Shagdom, 
South Sudan on December 12, 1994.191 The Agreement laid down detailed 
procedures for the exercise of this right, following the establishment of a 
confederal system of government in the Sudan for an interim period of two to 
four years, which would be under international supervision. This was another 
 
191. Copy of the Shagdom Agreement is on file with the author. See also SUDAN UMMA PARTY, 
http://www.umma.org/08/8,1b1.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2013). For discussion of the Shagdom Agreement, see 
Studies: New Existing Facts: Salva Kiir—From the Jungle to the Palace, SUDAN VISION (Jan. 15, 2012), 
http://www.sudanvisiondaily.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=10137. As indicated earlier, 
Shagdom was under the control of the SPLM/A at that time. 
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major breakthrough for the SPLM. With this agreement, the SPLM had the 
approval of the two largest political parties in the Sudan for the right of self-
determination for Southern Sudan. The Umma-SPLM agreement even granted 
the South a confederal system of government during the transitional period, 
which was another major achievement for the SPLM. 
Having attained the separate agreement of both the DUP and the Umma 
Party to its demand for self-determination, the SPLM’s next move was to get that 
agreement into one document that was signed by both parties and the SPLM. 
After all, the DUP and the Umma Party were, since independence of the Sudan, 
the largest two parties and the main obstacle to the demands of federation or 
regional autonomy for the South. This was achieved in Asmara on December 27, 
1994, when the Umma, the DUP, and SPLM met together, with the newly-
formed Sudanese Alliance Forces (“SAF”) (referred to together in that agreement 
as the “Main Political Forces in the Sudan”), and signed the Declaration of 
Political Agreement.192 After confirming the unity of the Sudan as the strategic 
choice of all the political groups, the Agreement recognized the right of self-
determination for Southern Sudan that was to be exercised after an interim 
period, which would be agreed upon in a more inclusive conference.193 
Although this was a major achievement for the SPLM, it was still only one 
building block towards a more inclusive document where the right of self-
determination would be recognized by the Northern political groups. 
Immediately after that Agreement, the SPLM moved swiftly to get the grouping 
of the Sudanese opposition political parties and trade unions, which were 
organized under the umbrella of the National Democratic Alliance and also 
included the SPLM, to endorse, as a group, the right of self-determination. This 
finally took place during the NDA’s meeting held in Asmara, Eritrea, from June 
15-23, 1995, which resulted in the issuing of the Asmara Declaration.194 
 The Asmara Declaration addressed and endorsed the right of self-
determination for the people of South Sudan as a basic, democratic, and human 
right, to be exercised after a transitional period. It is interesting to note that the 
justification given for granting the right is similar to what Father Lohure stated 
about forty years ago—reason and democracy.195 The Asmara Declaration started 
with a long preamble that underscored the urgent need to achieve peace and 
justice for all the marginalized people of the Sudan and the establishment of the 
New Sudan. It indicated the plan to hold a national conference for discussing and 
resolving all the pending problems of the Sudan. The Declaration went on to 
elaborate those problems and the plans for their resolution in fourteen points. 
 
192. Declaration of Political Agreement, SUDAN UMMA PARTY, http://www.umma.org/07/7,04a.htm (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2013). 
193. For the text of the Declaration of Political Agreement, see ALDAW, supra note 183, at 280-82. 
194. DE WAAL ET AL., supra note 185, at 78-81. 
195. For the reasoning given by Father Lohure, see PATERNO, supra note 1. 
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The first point emphasized the option of unity built on diversity of traditions, 
customs, religions, languages, races, cultures, and respect of those differences 
based on the international conventions and treaties thereon. It then endorsed the 
IGAD Principles as the basis for a just and sustainable resolution for the 
problems of the Sudan and recognized that the right of self-determination 
provided the basis for ending the civil war. The Declaration stated that the areas 
affected by the war were Southern Sudan, the Abyei area, and the Ingasana 
mountains in the Blue Nile Province. It then laid down its roadmap for a 
resolution for each of those areas. The people in Southern Sudan, within the 1956 
boundaries, would exercise the right of self-determination before the end of the 
transitional period. The options for the people of Southern Sudan were unity 
(federal or confederal) or secession. 
The people of the Abyei area would decide, through a referendum to be held 
during the transitional period, whether they wanted to remain within the 
geographical boundaries of the Kordofan province in the North, or to become 
part of the Bahr Al-Ghazal Province in the South. If they decided to be part of 
Bahr Al-Ghazal Province, then they would participate in the self-determination 
referendum of the South. As for the Ingasana area and the Nuba mountains area 
of South Kordofan, the transitional government would aim at achieving a 
political solution for addressing the injustices that prevailed in those areas, and 
would organize a referendum during the transitional period for ascertaining the 
views of the people of those areas about their future political and administrative 
status. The last point of the Declaration underlined the determination of the NDA 
for taking all the required action during the transitional period for rebuilding the 
institutions of the state to achieve the aims of the Declaration, including the 
holding of the self-determination referendum and supporting the unity option 
under the Declaration. 
The Declaration was clearly a defining moment in the history of the Sudan. 
The right and the left, religious, and secular political groups of the Sudan were 
able to forge some basic consensus on Sudan’s most pressing and difficult 
problem. However, the Declaration was a very optimistic and simplistic 
document. It was based on the overthrow of the NIF government and replacing it 
with the NDA government, as happened in 1964 and 1985, with the new 
government undertaking the self-determination referendum for the South. 
Ironically, the referendum would take place ten years later without any role or 
part for the NDA. Indeed, the Asmara Declaration would be the basis for the 
resolution, not only of the problems in Southern Sudan, but also those of the 
Abyei area and Blue Nile and South Kordofan states. 
The Asmara Declaration was signed by all the NDA political opposition 
parties and representatives of the trade unions in exile, as well as the SPLM/A.196 
 
196. Copy of the Asmara Declaration is on file with the author. See also SUDAN UMMA PARTY, 
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The outcome of the Asmara meeting was a major achievement for the SPLM. It 
sealed the right of self-determination among the opposition parties by giving it a 
solid legal and political foundation. The inclusion of the Abyei area and the 
referendum for the Blue Nile and South Kordofan states were definitely more 
than what the SPLM had hoped for. Although the Umma Party excluded the Blue 
Nile and South Kordofan in the Shagdom Agreement, it apparently voiced no 
objection to their inclusion in the Asmara Declaration. The Asmara meeting 
elected Mr. Mohamed Osman Al-Mirghani as the chairman of the NDA, Dr. John 
Garang as deputy chairman, and Mr. Mubarak Al-Fadil Al-Mahdi of the Umma 
party as the Secretary-General. This was clearly an attempt to underscore the 
unity of the opposition groups, and by implication of the Sudan. 
D. Reconfirmation by the Government of Sudan of the Right of Self-
Determination 
Clearly the SPLM had, by 1995, crossed a major threshold in its diplomatic 
campaign to win the right of self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan. 
But that was not the end of the SPLM campaign. On April 21, 1997, the NIF 
government of the Sudan concluded an agreement with a number of Southern 
groups, including a splinter group of the SPLM led by Mr. Riek Machar. The 
agreement, known as the Khartoum Peace Agreement, reconfirmed the right of 
self-determination for Southern Sudan pronounced in the Frankfurt Agreement 
and to be exercised through a referendum. The Khartoum Peace Agreement 
paved the way for the SPLM splinter groups to participate in the government in 
Khartoum.197 
The Khartoum Peace Agreement was preceded by the conclusion of a short 
agreement, which laid down the main principles of the Khartoum Peace 
Agreement, called the Political Charter for Peace. The Charter was signed in 
Khartoum on April 10, 1996, by a number of Southern parties and organizations. 
The Charter included a reference to the right of self-determination for the people 
of South Sudan to be exercised after a transitional period to be agreed upon by 
the parties.198 
As indicated earlier, the strategy of the government until that time centered 
on the tribal divisions of the South. It aimed at widening the rift between the 
 
Umma Party, the SPLM/A, the Coalition of the African Parties, the Sudanese Communist Party, the Legitimate 
Leadership of the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Beja Congress, the Sudanese Alliance Forces (“SAF”), a number 
of Trade Unions in exile, and a number of Sudanese national personalities. This grouping of parties and trade 
unions, including the SPLM/A, constituted the National Democratic Alliance. It should be added that a few 
weeks after the Asmara Declaration, the NDA agreed that the transitional period would be four years. 
197. For The Khartoum Peace Agreement, see 1997 Peace Agreement, Apr. 21, 1997, available at 
http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/sudan2.pdf. 
198. For the Political Charter for Peace, see MOHAMED AL-AMIN KHALIFA, PEACE STEPS DURING THE 
INGAZ ERA, ADDIS ABABA 1989-NAIVASHA 2005 218 (2005) (in Arabic). 
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Dinka, dominated by SPLM on the one hand, and the Nuer and the Shiluk tribes, 
led by Mr. Riek Machar and Mr. Lam Akol, respectively, on the other hand. 
Indeed, Mr. Akol joined the Khartoum Peace Agreement five months later 
through the Fashoda Agreement that was concluded on September 20, 1997, in 
Fashoda, South Sudan, between his group, another splinter of the SPLM, and the 
Sudan government.199 Subsequent to those agreements, both politicians joined the 
government in Khartoum. 
Furthermore, the Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan, issued by the 
NIF government on July 1, 1998, included a reference in Article 139(g) to the 
right of self-determination for South Sudan.200 Mr. Al-Turabi, the Speaker of the 
National Assembly and author of the 1998 Constitution, might have thought that 
such an oblique reference to self-determination would satisfy the Southerners, 
and would not be noticed by the Northerners.201 However, Mr. Machar would 
abandon his peace process with Khartoum and return a year later to the SPLM 
ranks, carrying with him the Khartoum Peace Agreement and the 1998 
Constitution of the Sudan as two more exhibits in the long list of evidence of 
acquiescence of the NIF, and later the NCP, government in Khartoum, as well as 
the Northern opposition groups, to the right of self-determination for Southern 
Sudan. 
Thus, by 1999 the SPLM had amassed a large number of agreements with 
both the government and the opposition parties recognizing the right of self-
determination for Southern Sudan. Those agreements included the Frankfurt 
Agreement of 1992, the IGAD Declaration of Principles of 1994, the U.S. House 
of Representatives resolution of 1994, the Cairo Agreement of 1994, the 
Shagdom Agreement of 1994, the Asmara Declaration of 1995, the Political 
Charter of 1996, the Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997, and the Sudan 
Constitution of 1998. It is interesting to note that the SPLM agreements until that 
time were with the opposition parties of the NDA, while the agreements of the 
SPLM splinter groups were with the government. By any standard, those 
instruments were an impressive achievement for the SPLM and its splinter 
groups, and a clear indication of their diplomatic skills and abilities. 
Those agreements, no doubt, facilitated the task of the SPLM negotiating 
team in Naivasha and paved the way for conclusion in July 20, 2002 of the 
Machakos Protocol, the flagship of the CPA, on self-determination for the people 
 
199. For the Fashoda Agreement, see AL-TOM & AJAWIN, supra note 179, at 225-26. 
200. For the Constitution of the Sudan of 1998, see THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN 
1998, available at http://www.sudanembassy.ca/Docs/THE%20CONSTITUTION%20OF%20THE%2 
0REPUBLIC%20OF%20THE%20SUDAN%201998.pdf. Article 139(g) indicated that Southern Sudan has a 
transitional system of federal government which would expire by the exercise of the right of self-determination. 
This Constitution was replaced by the 2005 Interim Constitution. 
201. Jacob K. Lupai, South Sudan Constitution Under Microscope, SUDAN TRIBUNE (May 9, 2011), 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=38845. 
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of Southern Sudan with the option of secession.202 It proved quite difficult during 
the CPA negotiations for the government team to pull out of those agreements. 
For example, Ms. Hilde Johnson wrote that when the government delegation 
balked during the CPA negotiations at the issue of the right of self-determination 
for Southern Sudan, members of her mediation team “reminded the government 
delegation that resisting an exercise of self-determination was problematic, since 
Khartoum had signed on to this in previous agreements and even embedded the 
principle in the constitution.”203 
Clearly, the point of no return and the moment of truth on self-determination 
for South Sudan were reached by this time for both the government and the 
opposition parties of the Sudan. The CPA sealed this fact and institutionalized 
and elaborated the right of self-determination in regards to how and when it 
would be exercised by the people of South Sudan, as discussed further below. 
Indeed, the right of self-determination was clearly highlighted in the Chapeau to 
the CPA, in addition to the detailed provisions elaborated in the Machakos 
Protocol. It was the only element of the CPA to be flagged in the Chapeau. 
The Sudanese opposition parties of the NDA endorsed the Machakos 
Protocol granting the South the right of self-determination. This decision was 
made during the NDA Council meeting held in Asmara on August 7, 2002, two 
weeks after the Protocol was concluded.204 Although the NDA political parties 
were not party to the negotiation process, they still had no choice, as they had 
individually and collectively endorsed that right earlier. Three years later, they 
would also endorse the CPA as a whole, although they did not participate in any 
session of the negotiations. They simply followed the whole negotiations process 
from a distance like any other interested group or persons. The government did 
not want them to participate even as observers, and the SPLM was not keen on 
fighting their case. In fact, in some instances, members of the SPLM indicated 
they were negotiating in the name of the NDA, of which the SPLM was a 
member, and indeed some members of the NDA repeated and perhaps believed 
that incredible statement. 
Although the government and the opposition parties competed with each 
other in appeasing the SPLM on the issue of the right of self-determination 
during the 1990s, they would in a few years regret it. A few days after the 
Southerners opted for secession in January of 2011, the government and the 
 
202. GOV’T OF THE REPUBLIC OF SUDAN & THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY, 
LANDMARK SUDANESE PEACE AGREEMENT: SUDAN GOVERNMENT CONCLUDES WITH THE SPLMA “MACHAKOS 
PROTOCOL” AND ISSUES A JOINT COMMUNIQUE (JULY 20, 2012), available at http://south sudanfriends.org/ 
News/Machakos.html. 
203. See HILDE JOHNSON, WAGING PEACE IN SUDAN, THE INSIDE STORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT 
ENDED AFRICA’S LONGEST CIVIL WAR 48-49 (2011). Ms. Johnson was then the Minister of International 
Development of Norway and was the representative of the Norway in the troika (United States, United 
Kingdom, and Norway) that mediated the CPA, together with IGAD.  
204. For discussion of the endorsement of the opposition parties of the National Democratic Alliance of 
the Machakos Protocol granting South Sudan the right of self-determination, see id. at 56. 
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opposition parties started pointing fingers at each other as to who was the first to 
recognize this right and who was really responsible and to blame for the 
secession of the South.205 The right of self-determination for the South was no 
longer an honor that the Northern Sudanese parties were competing to be 
associated with. It had by that time become a historical responsibility, indeed a 
burden, which each party wanted the other to shoulder the blame for. 
V. AGREEMENTS AND PROTOCOLS UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE 
AGREEMENT 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed on January 9, 2005, by the 
then first vice president of the Republic of the Sudan and the chairman of the 
SPLM/A, and was witnessed by envoys of thirteen countries and organizations—
the presidents of Kenya and Uganda and representatives of Egypt, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States, the African Union, 
the European Union, the IGAD, the Arab League, and the United Nations.206 This 
was another clear distinction from the Addis Ababa Agreement, which did not 
have such regional and global attention. 
In addition, the UN Security Council met in Nairobi on November 19, 2004, 
six weeks before the CPA was signed, and issued a resolution in which it 
reaffirmed its support for the Machakos Protocol of July 20, 2002, on the right of 
self-determination for South Sudan, and the subsequent agreements based on this 
Protocol. It further declared its strong support for the efforts of the government of 
Sudan and the SPLM/A to reach a Comprehensive Peace Agreement and strongly 
endorsed the parties’ commitment to reach a final comprehensive agreement by 
December 31, 2004, and expected that it would be fully and transparently 
implemented, with the appropriate international monitoring.207 
This wide range of participants to, and endorsements of, the CPA is a 
testament to the importance the world community had ascribed to the CPA and to 
the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Sudan. Sadly, the only relevant group 
that was not a witness to the CPA, or even present at the signing ceremony, was 
the NDA, the umbrella group of the opposition parties. Not a single NDA 
representative was even present at the signing ceremony. One would have 
thought that the SPLM, being a member of the NDA of which Mr. Garang was 
 
205. SPLM: Kuacjok ROR Preliminary Referendum Results, GURTONG (Jan. 22, 2011) http://www. 
gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/4736/SPLM-Kuacjok-ROR-
Preliminary-Referendum-Results.aspx. 
206. Press Release, Sudan Peace Agreement Signed 9 January Historic Opportunity, Security Council 
Told, U.N. Press Release SC/8306 (Aug. 2, 2005). 
207. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Nairobi Meeting Welcomes End of Year, 
U.N. Press Release SC/8249 (Nov. 19, 2004). This was one of the rare occasions in which the Security Council 
met outside the UN headquarters in New York. The purpose of the meeting in Nairobi was to give support to 
the Sudan Peace Process and encourage the parties to reach a final agreement. 
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its deputy chairman, would have insisted that the NDA attend the signing 
ceremony after having been kept out of the entire negotiating process. 
The CPA’s main provisions were reflected in the Interim National 
Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan which was adopted on July 6, 2005, six 
months after the conclusion of the CPA.208 This was another major distinction 
from the Addis Ababa Agreement that was adopted as an organic law, together 
with the other agreements. The SPLM had clearly learned a great deal from the 
past experience of South Sudan’s dealings with the North. It was determined to 
get it right this time, and indeed they did. 
Two other interesting features of the CPA need to be highlighted. The CPA 
indicated that the agreed Arabic and English texts of the CPA would both be 
official and authentic; however, in the event of a dispute regarding the meaning 
of any provision of the text, the English version would be authoritative. The 
justification stipulated in the Chapeau was that English was the language of the 
peace negotiations. However, this was a clear indication of the changing times 
and milieu brought about by the SPLM and the CPA. The other feature was that 
the official and authentic Arabic and English text of the CPA were lodged with 
the United Nations, the African Union, the IGAD Secretariat in Djibouti, the 
Arab League of States, and the Republic of Kenya. This step, particularly lodging 
the CPA with the United Nations, would clearly strengthen the legal and political 
foundations of the CPA.209 
The CPA consisted of the Chapeau,210 six protocols and agreements, and two 
annexures on the implementation of these instruments. The Chapeau recorded the 
long and continuous negotiations process that took place from May 22, 2002 to 
December 31, 2004 in Kenya.211 It referred to the tragic loss of life and 
 
208. The CPA is available at http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/General/cpa-
en.pdf. 
209. The fact that the CPA was lodged with the United Nations raises some interesting and intricate 
questions as to whether this action amounted to registration of the CPA under Article 102 of the UN Charter. 
That Article reads “[e]very treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United 
Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat 
and published by it.” U.N. Charter art. 102, para. 1. 
210. The Chapeau was the umbrella agreement that was signed by the two parties and the thirteen 
witnesses on January 9, 2005, and to which the other agreements and protocols constituting the CPA are 
attached. 
211. Negotiations took place under the auspices of IGAD. They were held in Karen, Machakos, Nairobi, 
Nakuru, Nanyuki, and Naivasha, all in Kenya. Because five of the six main agreements of the CPA were 
concluded at Naivasha, the CPA is often referred to as the Naivasha Agreement. Kenya played a major role in 
the negotiations and appointed General Lazaro Sumbeiywo as a mediator. The Chapeau clarified that the overall 
negotiations were carried out under the auspices of the IGAD Peace Process, and in respect of the issues related 
to the conflict areas of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States and Abyei area under the auspices of the 
Government of Kenya. Indeed, the preamble to the Machakos Protocol stated that the rejuvenated IGAD peace 
process under the chairmanship of the Kenyan President, H.E. Daniel T. arap Moi, provided the means to 
resolve the conflict and reach a just and sustainable peace. For a description of the negotiations process and the 
role of General Sumbeiywo, see WAITHAKA WAIHENYA, THE MEDIATOR: GEN. LAZARO SUMBEIYWO AND THE 
SOUTHERN SUDAN PEACE PROCESS (2006); see also JOHNSON, supra note 203. 
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destruction of infrastructure and erosion of the economic resources of the country 
that resulted from what had become the longest-running conflict in Africa. It 
emphasized the need for full adherence to the letter and spirit of the CPA to 
ensure lasting peace, security, justice, and equality in Sudan. The Chapeau 
underscored the commitment of the parties to a negotiated settlement on the basis 
of a democratic system of governance, which, on the one hand, recognized the 
right of the people of Southern Sudan to self-determination and, on the other, 
sought to make unity attractive during the interim period. The Chapeau also 
confirmed that the system of governance would be founded on the values of 
“justice, democracy, respect for fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, 
and mutual understanding and tolerance of diversity within the realities of the 
Sudan.” The Chapeau enumerated carefully the six agreements and protocols 
included in the CPA. It concluded with recognition of the enormity of the tasks 
that lay ahead in successfully implementing the CPA and a reconfirmation of the 
parties’ commitment to implement the CPA fully and jointly. 
The first and most important of those agreements was the Machakos 
Protocol, concluded on July 20, 2002. The preamble underscored the need to 
redress the historical injustices and inequalities in development between the 
different regions of the Sudan. It further confirmed the desire of the two parties 
to resolve the Sudan conflict in a just and sustainable manner by addressing the 
root causes of the conflict and by establishing a framework for governance 
through which power and wealth could be equitably shared and human rights 
guaranteed. The preamble noted that the rejuvenated IGAD peace process and the 
IGAD Declaration of Principles provided the means to resolve the conflict and 
reach a just and sustainable peace for the benefit of all the people of the Sudan. 
Thus, this last recital of the preamble to the Machakos Protocol had clearly set 
the scene for the right of self-determination because that right was the highlight 
of the IGAD Declaration. The Protocol stated in paragraph 1.1:  
That the unity of the Sudan, based on the free will of its people 
democratic governance, accountability, equality, respect, and justice for 
all citizens of the Sudan is and shall be the priority of the Parties and that 
it is possible to redress the grievances of the people of South Sudan and 
to meet their aspirations within such a framework.  
Yet, paragraph 1.3 hastened to add “that the people of South Sudan have the 
right to self-determination, inter alia, through a referendum to determine their 
future status.” More specifically, paragraph 2.5 stated that, “[a]t the end of the 
Interim Period, there shall be an internationally-monitored referendum, organized 
jointly by the [g]overnment of the Sudan and the SPLM/A, for the people of the 
South Sudan to: confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of 
government established under the Peace Agreement, or to vote for secession.” 
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Incorporating these provisions, the Interim Constitution reconfirmed the six-
year interim period, starting on July 9, 2005, with the referendum on the status of 
Southern Sudan to take place on January 9, 2011, six months before the end of 
the interim period on July 8, 2011.212 Although the Machakos Protocol was firm 
on dates, it missed dealing with and specifying the percentages of voters needed 
for the referendum and its results to be legally binding. Those two issues would 
become major areas of contention when the two parties started discussing the 
Southern Sudan Referendum Act in 2009. 
The Machakos Protocol, in a separate part, also dealt in detail with state and 
religion. The Protocol recognized “that Sudan is a multi-cultural, multi-racial, 
multi-religious, and multi-lingual country, and confirmed that religion would not 
be used as a divisive factor.” It stated that the “[r]eligions, customs and beliefs 
are a source of moral strength and inspiration for the Sudanese people,” and 
confirmed the “freedom of belief, worship, and conscience for followers of all 
religions or beliefs or customs.” However, the Protocol allowed Northern Sudan 
to continue with its Sharia laws. It stated that nationally-enacted legislation 
having effect only in respect of the states outside Southern Sudan would have as 
its source of legislation Sharia and the consensus of the people. Although the 
SPLM had insisted in the past on the total abrogation of the September Laws, it 
finally agreed in 2002 to exclude the South from the Sharia laws, and let them 
continue in the North. This clearly marked the end of the new secular unified 
Sudan called for under the SPLM Manifesto of July 1983. Henceforth, the 
Northerners opposed to the Sharia laws would have to fight their case 
themselves. The principle of a united new secular Sudan was no longer on the 
agenda of the SPLM. 
The Protocol proscribed discrimination against anyone on the basis of 
religion. More importantly, the Protocol stated that, “[e]ligibility for public 
office, including the presidency, public service and the enjoyment of all rights 
and duties shall be based on citizenship and not on religion, beliefs or customs.” 
Furthermore, “[a]ll personal and family matters including marriage, divorce, 
inheritance, succession and affiliations would be governed by the personal laws, 
(including Sharia or other religious laws, customs, or traditions) of those 
concerned.” Finally, in paragraph 6.5, the Protocol granted each of the two 
parties the right “[t]o observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and 
ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of one’s religious beliefs.”213 Thus, 
the Machakos Protocol concentrated on the two issues of self-determination—
state and religion. On the first issue, the Protocol included two diametrically 
 
212. The first six months after the CPA was signed (January 9, 2005 to July 8, 2005) were referred to as 
the pre-interim period. This period was devoted primarily to agreeing on and adopting the Interim Constitution 
on July 6, 2005 and putting in place the arrangements and institutions for the start of the interim period.  
213. This paragraph of the Protocol gave the SPLM the right to reverse the decision taken in 1960 during 
Abboud’s regime which imposed Friday as the day of rest in the South instead of Sunday. 
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contradictory features—the aspiration for unity of the Sudan and the right of the 
Southern Sudanese to self-determination with the option of secession. The debate 
on those two contradictory features and the issue of making unity attractive for 
the Southern Sudanese would dominate and cloud the entire interim six-year 
period before it finally led to the secession of South Sudan. 
The Agreement on Security Arrangements was concluded on September 25, 
2003.214 It provided for an internationally-monitored ceasefire to enter into effect 
upon the signing of the CPA. It also provided for the continued existence of two 
separate and equal armed forces during the interim period, the Sudanese Armed 
Forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, along with a number of joint 
integrated units incorporating members from both forces. 
The Agreement on Wealth Sharing, concluded on January 7, 2004, addressed 
land and natural resources, including oil.215 It provided for the establishment of a 
National Land Commission, a Southern Sudan Land Commission, a National 
Petroleum Commission, a Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring 
Commission, and an Oil Revenue Stabilization Account. It set forth guiding 
principles for sharing oil and non-oil revenues, and dealt with monetary policy, 
banking, currency, borrowing, and the establishment and operation of multi-
donor trust funds. The Wealth Sharing Agreement stipulated that the net revenue 
from the oil in Southern Sudan would be divided equally between the national 
government and the government of Southern Sudan, after deduction of a certain 
amount for the Oil Revenue Stabilization Account and two percent for each of 
the oil-producing states or regions.216 This provision was resented by most 
Southerners as unfairly giving half of their oil revenue to the North at a time 
when huge funds were needed to start the process of rebuilding the South. If the 
North was serious about the unity of the Sudan, then it no doubt had committed a 
grave mistake by taking half of the oil revenue of the South. If the South was 
looking for additional reasons to opt for secession, it found one in the oil sharing 
arrangement; indeed, a solid and major one. 
The Agreement on Power Sharing was concluded on May 26, 2004.217 It set 
forth principles of governance and human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Enumerated freedoms included freedom of thought, conscience and religion, 
expression, assembly, and association.218 It called for a decentralized system of 
 
214. GOV’T OF THE REPUBLIC OF SUDAN & THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY, 
AGREEMENT ON PERMANENT CEASEFIRE AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IMPLEMENTATION MODALITIES 
DURING THE PRE-INTERIM AND INTERIM PERIODS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SUDAN AND THE 
SPLM/SPLA (Dec. 31, 2004), available at http://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/agreement-permanent-ceasefire-
and-security-arrangements-implementation-modalities. 
215. Agreement on Wealth Sharing During the Pre-interim and Interim Period art. 5.3, Sudan-Sudan 
Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army, Jan. 7, 2004. 
216. Id. 
217. Protocol on Power Sharing, Sudan-Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army, May 26, 2004. 
218. See generally id. 
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government with significant devolution of powers to Southern Sudan, the states, 
and local governments, and described the structure and institutions of the 
national, Southern Sudan, and state governments.219 
The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Two States of Southern 
Kordofan and Blue Nile was also concluded on May 26, 2004.220 It dealt with 
those two states that are geographically part of Northern Sudan, but inhabited by 
people who identify culturally and ethnically with Southern Sudan. It called for 
the diverse cultures and languages of the people in these states to be developed 
and protected. It underscored the need for the development of the two states, and 
it set up special local structures, with significant powers devolved to them. It also 
stipulated carrying out of popular consultations for ascertaining the degree of 
achievement of these objectives.221 These two areas were engulfed in war with 
Khartoum just prior to the secession of Southern Sudan on July 9, 2011. As 
discussed earlier, the Asmara Declaration addressed those two areas and 
proposed a similar approach. The only difference was that the Asmara 
Declaration termed the process for achieving the objectives as “referendum,” 
while this Protocol called it “popular consultations.” 
The Protocol on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict, also known as the 
Abyei Protocol, was the third agreement concluded on May 26, 2004, and the 
sixth and last agreement under the CPA.222 Major difficulties were faced while the 
two parties were negotiating the Abyei issue. The parties were deadlocked on the 
definition and the size of the Abyei area, each sticking to its position. Moreover, 
the dispute was exacerbated by the competing claims of the Ngok Dinka, a 
Southern Sudanese tribe, and the Misseriya, a Northern Sudanese tribe, over the 
Abyei area. The Americans who were actively involved in the peace negotiations 
at that time stepped in attempting to break the deadlock over Abyei. The then 
U.S. Special Envoy to the Sudan, Senator John Danforth and his staff, presented 
in March 2004 certain proposals to the two parties, including a definition of the 
area, a process for delimiting it, and resolution to the dispute. Those proposals 
were accepted by the two parties and became the basis for the Abyei Protocol.223 
 
219. See generally id. 
220. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement ch. V, Sudan-Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army, 
May 26, 2004. 
221. See generally id. 
222. Protocol on The Resolution of the Abyei Conflict, Sudan-Sudan Peoples’ Liberation 
Movement/Army, May 26, 2004 [hereinafter Abyei Protocol]. 
223. See Resolution of Abyei Conflict, Protocol Between The Government of The Sudan & The Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement/Army n. 1 (May 26, 2004), available at: http://www.chr.up.ac.za/chr_old/indig- 
enous/documents/Sudan/Legislation/Abyei%20Peace%20Agreement%202004.pdf. The footnote on page 1 
stated that:  
This is the full text of the proposal entitled “Principles of Agreement on Abyei,” presented by 
US Special Envoy Senator John Danforth to H.E. First Vice President Ali Osman Mohamed 
Taha and SPLM/A Chairman Dr. John Garang on the 19th March 2004. The Parties hereby 
declare to adopt these Principles as the basis for the resolution of the Abyei Conflict. 
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The Protocol defined Abyei as the area that was transferred from Southern 
Sudan to the North during the colonial era in 1905.224 The Protocol established 
the Abyei Boundaries Commission (“ABC”) for defining the boundaries of the 
area. Once the Abyei area was defined, a referendum would be carried out 
simultaneously with the Southern Sudan referendum to determine the Abyei 
area’s future.225 The choices under the referendum were whether the Abyei area 
would continue as part of the North in a special administrative status, or whether 
it would revert back to the South.226 As discussed earlier, Abyei, though not 
mentioned by name, was dealt with in the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972. 
However, nothing was done during the Nimeiri era to resolve the dispute. As will 
be discussed later, the Abyei referendum did not take place as planned on 
January 9, 2011. The resolution of the Abyei dispute remains as remote as ever, 
with the issue continuing as one of the thorniest in the relationship between 
Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan. 
On December 31, 2004, two annexures were concluded on the 
implementation of the six agreements, covering issues such as timing, executing 
authority, funding sources, and procedures for the different components of the 
CPA. This brought to a successful conclusion the arduous negotiations that had 
spanned almost three years. The CPA was signed less than ten days later on 
January 9, 2005. The pre-interim period commenced and lasted until July 9, 
2005, when the interim period commenced. On July 6 of that year, the Interim 
National Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan was adopted, incorporating 
the basic provisions of the CPA.227 
As mentioned earlier, the SPLM had clearly managed to avoid the mistakes 
the SSLM committed in the Addis Ababa Agreement. The CPA, unlike the Addis 
Ababa Agreement, was one integrated agreement witnessed by a large number of 
countries and regional and international organizations. It would be fully reflected 
in the Interim Constitution of the Sudan (that was adopted on July 6, 2005) to the 
point of its supremacy over the Interim Constitution. The officers and soldiers of 
SPLA would not be integrated into the Sudanese armed forces. Rather, the SPLA 
would stay as a separate and equal army, which would form with the Sudanese 
Armed Forces (“SAF”), the national army of the Sudan, with some jointly 
integrated units. It is noteworthy that the system of government established under 
 
Id. 
224. Abyei Protocol, supra note 222, art. 1.1.2. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. Article 225 of the Interim Constitution stated: “The Comprehensive Peace Agreement is deemed to 
have been duly incorporated in this Constitution; any provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement which 
are not expressly incorporated herein shall be considered as part of this Constitution.” This Article attested 
clearly to the comprehensiveness and authority of the CPA and came very close to recognizing the supremacy 
of the CPA over the Interim Constitution. The government of Southern Sudan adopted its own Interim 
Constitution in December 2005.  
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the CPA was not given a classification. However, with the extensive powers 
given to the government in Juba—including the right to open liaison offices in 
foreign capitals with similar reciprocal rights to those countries and with two 
separate and equal armies—the system was clearly something akin to 
confederation. 
Mr. Garang returned to Khartoum on July 9, 2005 to an unprecedented hero’s 
welcome by a huge crowd totaling in the millions. He was sworn in as the First 
Vice President of the Republic of the Sudan, the highest political office ever to 
be held by a Southern Sudanese. He was also sworn in as the President of the 
government of Southern Sudan, while maintaining his position as the chairman of 
the SPLM/A. This was no doubt a defining moment in the history of the Sudan. 
A new chapter of the Sudan started that day with the commencement of the 
interim period. Ironically and sadly, it turned out to be the final chapter of the 
unified Sudan. 
VI. THE ROCKY INTERIM PERIOD AND THE FINAL SPLIT OF THE SUDAN 
As per the CPA and the Interim Constitution, the interim period started on 
July 9, 2005, following the adoption of the Constitution on July 6, 2005, and the 
return and swearing in of Mr. Garang as First Vice President on July 9, 2005.228 
However, less than a week later, sharp differences between the government and 
its new partner, the SPLM, started to surface. Those differences would grow in 
number and magnitude and would cloud the entire interim period, eventually 
leading to the secession of South Sudan. 
The first and most difficult difference that faced the two parties concerned 
the Abyei dispute and the report of the Abyei Boundaries Commission. The ABC 
was established pursuant to the “Understandings on the Abyei Boundaries 
Commission” concluded on December 17, 2004, seven months after the Abyei 
Protocol.229 The Understandings stated that the ABC would be established and 
would consist of fifteen members, as follows: (i) five members to be appointed 
by the government of Sudan representing the government, the Misseriya, and the 
administrators of the Abyei area; (ii) five members to be appointed by the SPLM 
representing the SPLM, the Dinka, and the administrators of the Abyei area; and 
(iii) five impartial experts (“Experts”) to be appointed by the United States, 
 
228. Sudan Peace Project, MAX PLANCK INST. FOR COMP. PUB. L. & INT’L L. (Mar. 15, 2012), 
http://www.mpil.de/ww/en/pub/research/details/know_transfer/africa_projects/sudan_peace_project.cfm. 
229. For the Understandings on the Abyei Boundaries Commission, see Abyei Boundary Commission 
Report, SUDAN TRIBUNE, 12 (Sept. 15, 2005), http://www.sudantribune.com/TEXT-Abyei-Boundary-
Commission,11633. In addition to the Understanding, the two parties concluded (i) the “Text of the Terms of 
Reference (‘TOR’) for the Abyei Boundaries Commission” on March 12, 2005; and (ii) the “Rules of Procedure 
for the Abyei Boundaries Commission” on April 11, 2005. Both instruments are also included in the ABC 
Report, at 14 and 18, respectively. 
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United Kingdom, and Inter-Governmental Authority on Development.230 The 
Abyei Protocol entrusted the ABC with the task of defining and demarcating the 
area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905. It was 
agreed by the parties and the fifteen members of the ABC that the Experts would 
examine and evaluate the material they gathered and prepare the report, which 
would be final and binding on the parties. 
The ABC presented its report to the Presidency of the Sudan (the President, 
First Vice President, and Vice President) on July 14, 2005, less than a week after 
Mr. Garang was sworn as First Vice President.231 The report demarcated the 
Abyei area in a manner close to the demands of the SPLM and far exceeding the 
area acknowledged by the government to be Abyei.232 The report was 
immediately rejected by the government of the Sudan who claimed that the ABC 
had exceeded its authority. The SPLM welcomed the report and insisted that the 
report, as per the Abyei Protocol, was final and binding on the parties. This was 
the first setback to the CPA, and it was indeed a major one. It led to a complete 
stalemate on the Abyei dispute and created an environment that was not 
conducive to resolving other differences. Henceforth, the Abyei dispute would 
remain the thorniest issue in the Sudan North-South peace process and 
relations.233 
This setback was followed by a sharp disagreement on the allocation of 
ministries in the new partnership government to be composed of the two parties 
under the CPA and the Interim Constitution. The SPLM demanded that either the 
Ministry of Energy or the Ministry of Finance be allocated to the SPLM. The 
demand was rejected by the ruling NCP which insisted on holding both ministries 
by virtue of being the senior partner in the government. The leaders of the NCP 
should have known that their insistence and intransigency in keeping under their 
domain the oil that came largely from the South, and the revenue it generated, 
would simply strengthen the secessionist trends within the South. The 
Southerners would succumb and give up both ministries, knowing very well that 
 
230. Those five experts were Ambassador Donald Petterson (former U.S. ambassador to the Sudan), U.S. 
appointee; Dr. Douglas Johnson (scholar and expert on Southern Sudan), U.K. appointee; and the three IGAD 
appointees: Professor Godfrey Muriuki (University of Nairobi); Professor Kassahun Berhanu (University of 
Addis Ababa); and Mr. Shadrack Gutto (a South African lawyer). Ambassador Petterson was selected as the 
Chair of the ABC in accordance with the wishes of the Government of Sudan and the SPLM. 
231. Roger Winter, Abyei: Sudan’s “Kashmir”, ENOUGH (Jan. 28, 2008), http://www.enoughproject. 
org/publications/abyei-sudan%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Ckashmir%E2%80%9D. 
232. See ABYEI BOUNDARIES COMMISSION REPORT (THE EXPERTS’ REPORT) (2005), available at 
http://sudanarchive.net/cgi-bin/pagessoa?a=pdf&d=Dl1d18&dl=1&sim=Screen2Image. 
233. For an analysis of the decision of ABC, see Donald Petterson, Abyei Unresolved: A Threat to the 
North-South Agreement, in IMPLEMENTING SUDAN’S COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT: PROSPECTS AND 
CHALLENGES 22, 22-31 (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Africa Program ed., 2008), 
available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Africa_SudanCPA_rpt_booklet.pdf. As indicated 
earlier, Mr. Petterson was the selected by the two parties as the chair of the ABC. See also Breaking the Abyei 
Deadlock, INT’L CRISIS GROUP (Oct. 12, 2007), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-
africa/sudan/B047-sudan-breaking-the-abyei-deadlock.aspx. 
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it was a matter of time before they would control all of their oil and all the 
revenue it generated. The SPLM received the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That 
was the first time ever that a Southerner would hold that ministry.234 Mr. Lam 
Akol Ajawin, the on-and-off member of the SPLM, would hold that portfolio for 
the first two years of the interim period from September 2005 to October 2007. 
The country, and indeed the whole region, was shocked when three weeks 
into the interim period, Mr. Garang was killed in a plane crash on July 30, 2005, 
while returning to the South from Kampala on a Ugandan presidential jet. Riots 
broke out, and Khartoum was engulfed in major disturbances.235 The rioters 
simply could not believe or accept the fact that the government was not involved 
in the accident. The security forces dealt harshly with the rioters, and some were 
killed and many were arrested. Both the death of Mr. Garang and the riots were 
bad omens for the future of the Sudan. 
Mr. Salva Kiir took over as the new chairman of the SPLM, First Vice 
President of the Sudan, and President of the government of Southern Sudan. 
Many people, particularly the sympathizers of the SPLM in the North, started 
doubting the commitment of the new leadership of the SPLM to the vision of the 
New Sudan and to the unity of the country. For most of those people, the vision 
of the New Sudan was buried in Juba with the coffin of Mr. John Garang in the 
early days of August 2005. In my view too, the South by that moment had clearly 
made up its mind on its future relationship with the North. Any remaining 
thoughts of unity after the Torit meeting of 1991 were gone once and for all. The 
first anniversary of the CPA, January 9, 2006, passed quietly, and none of the 
government officials travelled to Juba to participate in the celebrations. In fact, 
during the entire interim period, the President of the Sudan travelled to Juba only 
three times; the last two visits were in the last year of the interim period. 
Differences between the NCP and the SPLM continued to grow. In October 
2007, the SPLM withdrew from the national government over a number of 
issues, including the continued refusal of the NCP to accept the ABC report on 
the boundaries of Abyei.236 The SPLM ministers eventually returned to their 
ministries, but the Abyei dispute remained unresolved. Diplomatic efforts by the 
IGAD and the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan continued, but did not lead to a 
breakthrough. 
 
234. Mr. Francis Deng was appointed as State Minister for Foreign Affairs by Mr. Nimeiri from 1976 to 
1980, four years after the Addis Ababa Agreement was concluded in 1972. He was the first Southerner to hold 
that position. A State Minister is basically a Deputy Minister. The Minister himself to whom Mr. Francis Deng 
reported was a Northerner. Nhial Deng Nhial, SUDAN TRIBUNE, http://www.sudantribune.com/+-Nhial-Deng-
Nhial,833-+?debut_articles=10#pagination_articles (last visited Feb. 21, 2013). 
235. Mabior Atem de Kuir, Death of Dr. John Garang: Huge Controversial and Worse Scenario of the 
Year, GURTONG (Aug. 21, 2007), http://www.gurtong.net/Forum/tabid/81/forumid/91/threadid/45173/ 
scope/posts/Default.aspx. 
236. SPLM Withdraw from Sudan National Unity Government, SUDAN TRIBUNE (Oct. 11, 2007), 
http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24184. 
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Furthermore, there were also sharp differences on the actual amounts of 
revenue the oil of Southern Sudan generated and, as a result, the actual share of 
South Sudan. As stipulated under the Wealth Sharing Protocol, the North was 
entitled to half the revenue of the oil from South Sudan. It was estimated at that 
time that about seventy-five percent of the Sudan proven oil resources were in 
South Sudan. The Southerners were angered by the arrangement under the CPA 
that gave the North half of their oil revenue and the refusal of the NCP to allocate 
the Ministry of Energy to the SPLM. About three years into the interim period, 
they were further angered by reports that they might not even receive that unfair 
share of the revenue of their own oil.237 It is surprising that the NCP leaders failed 
to see how the division and management of South Sudan oil and its revenue 
during the interim period could provide a very strong incentive for the South to 
secede, as secession simply meant getting all their oil and its revenue.238 
Meanwhile, application of the September Laws continued, and many 
Southern youths in Khartoum were lashed publicly for allegedly either drinking 
alcohol or not abiding by the dress code imposed by those harsh laws. The streets 
that were named after leading NCP members killed in the war in the South, with 
the title “martyr” before the name, continued to have those names. This certainly 
overlooked or ignored the fact that Sudan was passing through a new and 
different era and that the negative effects of the civil war should be rectified and 
not glorified. On the other hand, not a single street, building, or institution was 
named after Mr. Garang following his death in July 2005. Moreover, for some 
time, the stamp duties in the name of, and supposedly to help, the “martyrs’” 
families killed in the war and those wounded in the war in the South, which were 
imposed for almost every transaction with the government, continued to be levied 
and collected, even from Southern Sudanese. Furthermore, the voices of some 
Northern Sudanese calling for separation of the South and criticizing and even 
 
237. See GLOBAL WITNESS, FUELLING MISTRUST—THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY IN SUDAN’S OIL 
INDUSTRY (2009), available at http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/fuelling_mistrust_english_ 
without_pictures.pdf. The report stated on page 4 that: 
The oil figures published by the Khartoum government do not match those from other sources. 
These figures determine the revenues disbursed to the government of Southern Sudan. The 
Khartoum government has reported that a smaller volume of oil was produced in southern oil 
blocks than is reported by the company that operates the blocks. It is not clear which set of 
figures, company or government, are the correct ones, but the discrepancy highlights the need 
for the oil figures to be independently verified. 
Id. 
238. During his first visit to the United States as First Vice President and President of the government of 
Southern Sudan in October 2005, Mr. Salva Kiir held a public meeting with the Sudanese community in 
Washington D.C. at the American University auditorium. Mr. Kiir was asked by one young angry Southern man 
as to why the SPLM agreed under the CPA to give up half of Southern Sudan oil to the North when the South 
needed every dollar for economic development. Mr. Kiir replied calmly that it was a deal—oil for self-
determination. He went further and advised the young man to go and prepare his people to vote for 
independence if he wanted the South to get all its oil. The author was one of the people who attended the public 
meeting with Mr. Kiir. 
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referring with disrespect to the SPLM and its leaders started getting louder, and 
the authorities did nothing to curtail their activities or counter their calls or 
arguments. They even managed to publish a daily newspaper to disseminate their 
views.239 All those actions and omissions, no doubt, added to the sense of 
resentment and kept feeding and strengthening the secessionist tendencies and 
inclinations within the Southern Sudanese. 
Along those lines of the widening rift between the two parts of the country, 
the government of Southern Sudan declared, in 2007, the 18th of August every 
year as a national holiday in South Sudan, calling it the “Day of War Veterans.” 
This was in commemoration of the mutiny of the Equatorial Corps of the Sudan 
Defense Force in Torit on August 18, 1955, which refused the order of the 
transfer to the North.240 As discussed earlier, that mutiny marked the start of the 
civil war in the Sudan. Addressing the celebrations on August 18, 2008, Vice 
President Salva Kiir described the Torit events “as the starting point of the real 
political movement in Southern Sudan.”241 
In May 2008, fighting broke out between the Sudanese army and the SPLA 
in Abyei Town, and the city was completely devastated.242 UN officials estimated 
that more than one hundred people might have been killed and that 30,000 
residents of Abyei Town and 20,000 from neighboring villages fled at the height 
of the fighting.243 This incident underscored the fragility of the situation in Abyei 
and indicated the threat to the larger North-South peace process posed by the 
failure to resolve the Abyei dispute. The fighting and devastation of the Abyei 
Town forced the two parties to rethink their strategies and return to the 
negotiating table over the Abyei dispute. 
After a series of meetings and mediation by the African Union, the two 
parties signed on July 11, 2008, the Arbitration Agreement referring the Abyei 
dispute for final and binding arbitration to the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(“PCA”) in The Hague. The Arbitration was governed by the PCA’s Optional 
Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two Parties of Which Only One is a 
State.244 The PCA arbitral tribunal was to determine whether the ABC had 
exceeded its mandate—to delimit the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms that 
had been transferred to Kordofan in 1905.245 The tribunal consisted of five 
 
239. See INTIBAHA NEWSPAPER, http://alintibaha.net/portal/ (in Arabic) (last visited Apr. 29, 2013). 
240. See Dak, supra note 61. 
241. See id. For more on the Torit disturbances of 1955, see supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
242. Press Release, Security Council, Briefing Security Council, Special Representative for Sudan 
Rejects Claims United Nations Mission Did Nothing During Abyei Crisis in May, U.N. Press Release SC/9424 
(Aug. 18, 2008). 
243. Id. 
244. The Permanent Court of Arbitration defines its optional rules for arbitrating disputes between two 
parties of which only one is a state. See Rules of Procedure, PERMANENT CT. ARB., http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1188 (last visited Mar. 12, 2013). 
245. James Gatdet Dak, Sudan Peace Partners Agree on The Hague to Arbitrate Abyei, SUDAN TRIBUNE 
(June 21, 2008), http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?page=imprimable&id_article=27606. 
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arbitrators. Each party appointed two arbitrators, and the four party-appointed 
arbitrators were tasked with appointing the presiding arbitrator.246 However, none 
of the five candidates identified by them was accepted by the two parties. 
Accordingly, the PCA Secretary-General appointed the presiding arbitrator.247 
The tribunal adhered to a very tight schedule. Memorials were filed on December 
18, 2008, and the counter-memorials on February 13, 2009, with the rejoinder 
filed on February 28, 2009. Oral hearings took place at The Hague, April 18 to 
23, 2009, and the arbitral tribunal of the PCA issued its award on July 22, 2009.248 
The decision of the PCA indicated that the ABC exceeded its mandate in 
some areas, but not in other areas. The size of the Abyei area, as delimited by the 
tribunal award, is about 10,460 square kilometers.249 This is a considerable 
reduction from the area set by the ABC report, which was 18,559 square 
kilometers.250 This substantial reduction made it easier for the government to 
accept the decision of the tribunal, and indeed to present it as a victory, even 
though the area was still larger than what the government initially presented. 
The award also confirmed the established traditional rights within or in the 
vicinity of the Abyei area—particularly, the right of the Misseriya and other 
nomadic peoples to graze cattle and move across the Abyei area.251 Both the 
government and the SPLM accepted the PCA tribunal award. The United 
Nations, European Union, United States, and IGAD also welcomed the decision 
and saw it as a major step toward resolving the Abyei dispute. On the other hand, 
the leaders of the Misseriya tribe rejected the decision. They claimed that the 
territory delimited by the PCA tribunal award, as the Abyei area gave too much 
of their own land and villages to the Ngok Dinka and restricted their rights over 
the area to grazing rights. 
 
246. Unlike the International Court of Justice (which is also at The Hague, and is usually referred to as 
the ICJ), the PCA does not have its own regularly presiding judges. Instead, each party to a case appoints an 
equal number of arbitrators. Once appointed, those arbitrators together recommend a presiding arbitrator to the 
two parties. Id. 
247. The government of Sudan appointed Judge Awn Al-Khasawneh of the ICJ and Professor Gerhard 
Hafner. The SPLM appointed Professor Michael Reisman and Judge Stephen Schwebel. The Secretary-General 
of the PCA appointed Professor Pierre-Marie Dupuy, as the Presiding Arbitrator. Abyei Arbitration—December 
2008, PERMANENT CT. ARB., http://www.pca-cpa.org/shownews.asp?ac=view&nws_id=255&pag_id=1264 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2013). 
248. For a copy of the Arbitral Tribunal Award, see The Government of Sudan/The Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army (Abyei Arbitration), PERMANENT CT. ARB., http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp? 
pag_id=1306 (last visited Mar. 27, 2012). 
249. Abyei: Understanding the Decision of the Abyei Arbitration Tribunal, EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC 
OF S. SUDAN TO BELG. & THE EUR. UNION (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.goss-brussels.com/index.php/index. 
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2915:abyei:_understanding_the_decision_of_the_abyei_arbitration
_tribunal&catid=34:news&Itemid=70. 
250. Paul Von Muhlendahl, International Tribunal Redraws Boundaries of Sudanese Abyei Region: A 
Chance for Peace? THE HAGUE JUST. PORTAL (Dec. 10, 2009), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php? 
id=11256. 
251. Id. 
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In December of 2009, the National Assembly adopted the Southern Sudan 
Referendum Act and the Abyei Area Referendum Act.252 The Abyei Area 
Referendum Act confirmed the boundaries of the Abyei area, as determined and 
delimited by the PCA tribunal award, notwithstanding the Misseriya rejection of 
the award.253 The Act also confirmed the date for the Abyei referendum, January 
9, 2011, as determined by the Abyei Protocol of the CPA and the Interim 
Constitution.254 It called for an Abyei Area Referendum Commission to be 
established as a legally and financially independent entity with its head office in 
Abyei Town, and branch offices where the Commission deemed necessary.255 The 
Act gave the Commission wide powers with regard to the conduct of the 
referendum. The Act invited the thirteen countries and organizations that had 
witnessed the signing of the CPA, as well as international, regional, and local 
nongovernmental organizations, to supervise the Abyei referendum.256  
The Abyei Area Referendum Act was silent on who were considered 
residents of the Abyei area and thus would be eligible to participate in the 
referendum.257 The Abyei Protocol defined the residents of Abyei as “[t]he 
Members of the Ngok Dinka community and other Sudanese residing in the 
area”
258
 and stated that “[t]he criteria for residence shall be worked out by the 
Abyei Referendum Commission.”259 The Act did not reiterate the definition of 
residency as it did with other provisions of the Abyei Protocol and other parts of 
the CPA.260 Perhaps the reason for this was the demand of the Misseriya tribe that 
they also be mentioned by name in the Act as residents of the Abyei area, which 
was vehemently rejected by the SPLM and the Ngok Dinka. It seems that the 
compromise reached by the framers of the Act was neither to reiterate the Abyei 
Protocol’s definition, which specified the Ngok Dinka, nor to mention the 
Misseriya by name, but to leave the issue to the Abyei Referendum Commission. 
This approach must also be seen as a way of allaying the disappointment of the 
Misseriya over the incorporation by the Act of the boundaries of the Abyei area 
as established and delimited by the tribunal award. 
However, the adoption of the Abyei Area Referendum Act did not pave the 
way for holding the referendum in Abyei on January 9, 2011, as envisaged under 
the Abyei Protocol.261 The Misseriya, with support from the government of 
 
252. Abyei Protocol, supra note 222. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
258. See id. at para. 6.1. 
259. Id. at para. 6.2. 
260. See generally id. at para. 6.1. 
261. Salman M. A. Salman, The Abyei Territorial Dispute Between Northern and Southern Sudan and the 
Decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, THE WORLD BANK (July 2010), http://web.worldbank.org/ 
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Sudan, insisted that they were residents of the Abyei area, and that they lived 
there long before the Ngok Dinka moved to the area.262 They contended that they 
were covered by the Abyei Protocol under “other Sudanese residing in the 
area.”
263
 Thus, they believed, they had the right to participate in the referendum. 
They also raised the point that they were entitled under the Abyei Protocol to two 
percent of the net oil revenue from the Abyei area, on par with the Ngok Dinka.264 
This, in their view, was a clear recognition of their equal rights with the Ngok 
Dinka over the Abyei area, and that such equality should extend to participating 
in the referendum on equal footing with the Ngok Dinka.265 
The SPLM and the Ngok Dinka rejected this demand.266 They contended that 
the Misseriya were not specifically mentioned, like the Ngok Dinka, as residents 
of the area under the Abyei Protocol and accordingly were not eligible to 
participate in the referendum.267 Moreover, they claimed that the definition of the 
Abyei area under the Abyei Protocol made it clear that the area was exclusively a 
Ngok Dinka area.268 They also interpreted the PCA tribunal award, which 
confirmed the Misseriya’s grazing rights as an indication that the Misseriya were 
not residents of the Abyei area, but only rights holders.269 
This issue has turned out to be the crux of the Abyei dispute, overshadowing 
the original issue of the size and borders of the Abyei area. The extension of the 
Abyei area by both the ABC report, and later by the tribunal award, beyond the 
triangle south of the Bahr el Arab River (as claimed by the government of Sudan 
and agreed to by the Misseriya) must have prompted the claim of the Misseriya 
that they are residents of the expanded Abyei area. As indicated earlier, the 
Misseriya claimed and complained that the tribunal award gave too much of their 
own land and villages to the Ngok Dinka. Furthermore, because of this basic 
difference, the Abyei Referendum Commission has not been established. 
Differences persisted on who should head the commission, as each party insisted 
on its chairmanship. The SPLM insisted that since the Southern Sudan 
Referendum Commission was headed by a Northerner, then the Abyei Area 
 
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/0,,contentMDK:22607203~pagePK:148956~piPK:14908
1~theSitePK:445634,00.html. 
262. Sudan: Another Year Passes with No Referendum of Abyei, CISA NEWS AFR. (Jan. 13, 2013), 
http://www.cisanewsafrica.com/?p=8582. 
263. Id. 
264. Paragraph 3.1 of the Abyei Protocol stated that the net revenue from the oil produced in the Abyei 
area would be shared as follows: fifty percent to the national government, forty-two percent to the government 
of Southern Sudan, and two percent to each of Bahr Al-Ghazal state, South Kordofan State, Ngok Dinka and 
Misseriya. Abyei Protocol, supra note 222, at para. 3.1. 
265. Sudan Turns Down Mediation’s Proposal to Settle the Abyei Issue, SUDAN TRIBUNE (Sept. 25, 
2012), http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article44014. 
266. Id. 
267. Id. 
268. Id. 
269. Id. 
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Referendum Commission should be headed by a Southerner. Moreover, the 
boundaries of the Abyei area have not yet been demarcated because of the 
rejection by the Misseriya of the PCA tribunal award. 
Although the dispute over the size and boundaries of the Abyei area was 
resolved by the PCA and the resolution reflected in the Abyei Area Referendum 
Act, the issues got more complicated in regard to the referendum.270 Indeed, this 
issue became the new and main element of the Abyei dispute and could not be 
resolved by the time the referendum was supposed to take place. Consequently, 
the Abyei referendum did not take place simultaneously with the Southern Sudan 
referendum on January 9, 2011, as stipulated under the CPA and the Interim 
Constitution. Each party kept blaming the other for the failure to undertake the 
referendum.271 The failure to resolve the Abyei dispute no doubt had its effects on 
the other pending issues and problems between Sudan and South Sudan. 
One of those issues related to the boundaries between the two parts of the 
country, and later, the boundaries between the two states. The Abyei Protocol 
repeatedly stated that the January 1, 1956 line between the North and the South 
would be inviolate.272 However, despite the extensive work of the boundaries 
commission, a large number of border areas continued to be in dispute. 
Disagreements about the revenue generated from the oil sales also continued, 
with accusations and counter accusations of corruption and mismanagement. 
Moreover, the SPLM kept complaining that their ministers in the central 
government were marginalized and kept powerless by the bureaucratic and 
powerful network of the NCP staff in those ministries. 
The First Vice President, Mr. Salva Kiir, spent most of his time during the 
interim period in Juba or travelling outside the country. He was rarely in 
Khartoum, and the Presidency hardly met. Mr. Salva Kiir did not visit a single 
Northern state during the interim period; not even Darfur, which was engulfed in 
a civil war much like the South before 2005. He did not attend any national event 
or inaugurate any national project. Clearly, the office of the First Vice President 
did not interest or concern him much. He indicated on many occasions that he 
preferred to be referred to as President of the government of South Sudan.273 
As the two parties were wrangling over those issues, the security situation in 
a number of areas in Southern Sudan had been steadily deteriorating in the latter 
 
270. Muhlendahl, supra note 250. 
271. For a detailed account of the Abyei dispute, see Salman M. A. Salman, The Abyei Territorial 
Dispute Between North and South Sudan: Why Has Its Resolution Proven Difficult? in LAND AND POST-
CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING (Jon Unruh & Rhodri Williams, eds., 2013). In May 2011, the Sudanese army took 
over Abyei area, following the ambush and killing of some its soldiers by the SPLA. Eventually, the UN 
Security Council intervened in the Abyei dispute and sent Ethiopian soldiers as peace-keepers. However, the 
dispute remains as one of the thorniest issues in the Sudan South Sudan relations. 
272. See Abyei Protocol, supra note 222, at para. 1.4. 
273. Gabrial Pager Ajang, The President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, Must Resign, SOUTH SUDAN NEWS 
AGENCY (Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/opinion/articles/the-president-of-south-sudan-
salva-kiir-must-resign. 
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years of the interim period. Military clashes with armed militias, intertribal 
fights, and food shortages have been regularly reported since early 2009.274 The 
government of Southern Sudan continued to accuse and blame the Khartoum 
government of arming and supplying the militias in the South. On March 11, 
2011, the government of Southern Sudan issued a strongly worded statement 
accusing the government of Sudan of trying to overthrow the government of 
Southern Sudan by arming and supplying militias opposed to it—accusations that 
were denied by the government of Sudan.275 The government of Southern Sudan 
indicated that it would complain to the UN Security Council and suspended talks 
and contacts with the government on all the pending issues.276 A few days later, 
the government of Southern Sudan complained officially to the UN Security 
Council.277 The Council invited both the Secretary-General of the SPLM as well 
as the representative of the government of Sudan to its 6,499th meeting held on 
March 21, 2011, to discuss the “Reports of the Secretary-General on the 
Sudan.”278 However, no decisions were made on the complaint of the government 
of Southern Sudan.279 
The Southern Sudan Referendum Act 2009 was adopted in December of that 
year, more than two years after the date in 2007 stipulated for its adoption in the 
CPA and the Interim Constitution.280 The delay underscored the difficulties and 
controversies surrounding the referendum details. One major area of difference 
concerned the percentages of voters needed for validity of the referendum and for 
South Sudan to secede. Strangely enough, those figures were not specified in the 
CPA, and it took considerable time and effort to agree on them.281 The Act listed 
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ten issues that were supposed to be resolved by the two parties immediately after 
the referendum. Those issues comprised nationality; currency; public service; 
position of joint integrated units; international agreements and treaties; debts and 
assets; oil fields, production and transport; oil contracts; water resources; and 
property.282 Attempts to resolve those issues during the period between adoption 
of the Referendum Act in December 2009 and the emergence of South Sudan as 
an independent state on July 9, 2011 were not successful. Most of the issues, in 
addition to the borders and the Abyei dispute, had to be carried over to the post-
secession era and negotiated between two separate states, reflecting the 
magnitude of the differences between the NCP government and the SPLM. 
Needless to say, negotiations between states are bound to be more difficult and 
strenuous than negotiations between two parts of the same state. 
As the interim period was coming to a close, and with problems and 
differences mounting, it was clear that the dreams of unity and a New Sudan had 
completely evaporated once and for all.283 Indeed, the question in the minds of 
many Sudanese was not whether the South would secede.284 Rather, the question 
was whether Sudan and the new state of South Sudan would live in peace, or 
whether the war would erupt again, this time between two states, à la Ethiopia 
and Eritrea after the secession of Eritrea.285 
VII. CONCLUSION 
On July 9, 2011, more than one-fifth of the population of the Sudan, and 
more than one-fourth of its area size seceded, declared independence, and formed 
a separate country, called the Republic of South Sudan.286 As a result, Sudan lost, 
among many other things, its basic defining characteristic of being the largest 
country in Africa, and Africa’s microcosm. The ethnic, religious, linguistic, and 
cultural differences and diversity that are usually a source of strength for nations 
were Sudan’s weakness. This is because the sense of the superiority of the Arab-
Islamic culture dominated the thinking and actions of all the Northern political 
leaders and their parties in Sudan, even before Sudan became independent. For 
those leaders, Sudan’s identity is an Arab-Islamic one, to the total exclusion of 
other cultures, religions, races, and languages; Southern Sudan was simply a 
cultural vacuum to be filled by Northern Sudan values and norms. 
Thus, the war dragged on and was fed by religious and ideological slogans. 
The civilian as well as the military governments of the Sudan since 1955 
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competed in intensifying the civil war and in implementing and enforcing the 
exclusivists polices and ideologies of the Arab-Islamic culture. Reports indicated 
that more than two million Southern Sudanese were killed in the civil war 
between 1955 and 2005, and about four million Southern Sudanese fled the 
South to the neighboring countries, or to the North.287 Hundreds of thousands of 
Northern Sudanese were also killed during the civil war, the largest part during 
the Jihad era of the NIF/NCP government. The dead during this era included the 
young “martyrs” of the popular defense forces, in addition to the Sudanese 
soldiers and army officers. 
As discussed throughout, many opportunities to resolve the Sudan North-
South conflict and to stop the devastating civil war, bloodshed, and the collapsing 
economy presented themselves. They were all persistently blundered, one after 
the other, by the different Northern political parties and their leaders. The Juba 
Conference of 1947, the independence of the Sudan resolution of 1955, the 
roundtable conference of 1965, the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, the Koka 
Dam Declaration of 1985, the Sudanese Peace Initiative of 1988, and the unity 
option under the CPA of 2005, each provided a golden opportunity that was 
recklessly squandered by the Northern Sudanese leaders. The Northern political 
leaders, particularly the ruling NCP, should have known that the CPA provided 
the last opportunity ever for keeping the Sudan united. Yet, they did everything 
possible to make unity unattractive and to push the Southerners in the direction 
of secession. One promise after the other to the Southern Sudanese was broken, 
one agreement after the other was dishonored, and each opportunity for keeping 
the Sudan together blundered.288 
The imposition of the Arab-Islamic culture fed the resentment and anger of 
the Southerners, provided new “mutineers” to their fighting forces, and gave 
them reasons to secede. The Southerners also saw their oil and water being 
transported to the North, with the Wealth Sharing Agreement giving the North 
half the South’s oil, at the time when the South was the least developed region on 
earth and needed every dollar to pull its people from their poverty and misery. 
The failure of Sudan’s political leaders to acknowledge the North-South 
differences, and to recognize, respect, and accommodate them was abundantly 
evident and clear during the fifty years of independent Sudan. Mr. Al-Azhari’s 
harsh, hasty, and unfortunate reaction to the 1955 disturbances, and his failure to 
comprehend the reasons behind them, were some early examples. His exclusivist 
statements during the roundtable conference in 1965 on the Arab-Islamic identity 
of Sudan were other examples. He, his party, and the Umma Party, failed to see 
that the amendment of the constitution to create a permanent president of the 
Supreme Council of State, and the appointment of Mr. Al-Azhari to that post, 
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meant the deprivation, once and for all, of the Southern member of being head of 
the state for two months a year. Mr. Al-Azhari’s statements on the Arab-Islamic 
identity of the Sudan were repeated one year later, albeit more strongly, by Mr. 
Sadig Al-Mahdi, after the latter became Prime Minister, in his address in 1966 to 
the Constituent Assembly. Further, Mr. Mahjoub’s remarks that the inclusion of 
the reference to the federal system for the South “was meant to make the 
Southerners happy and get them to go along with the independence resolution” 
were unfortunate and showed a dismissive attitude towards the Southern 
Sudanese. His perception of the problem of Southern Sudan as one of law and 
order, and the adoption of a resolution to that effect unanimously by the 
Constituent Assembly in 1965, was an evident leadership failure and a 
continuation of the mistaken and simplistic policies of General Abboud. 
However, Mr. Al-Turabi’s statement that the South had no culture, so this 
vacuum would necessarily be filled by Arab culture under an Islamic revival, was 
no doubt the most arrogant and unfortunate of all. That way of thinking paved the 
way and sowed the seeds for the Jihad mentality and the ruthless military 
campaign against the Southerners following the NIF military coup in June 1989. 
Sudan also received all the help that its neighbors could afford to provide. 
Ethiopia hosted the Addis Ababa negotiations in 1972 and helped forge the Addis 
Ababa Agreement that year. Nigeria provided substantial assistance to the Abuja 
negotiations in 1992 and 1993. The IGAD countries, poor and saddled with their 
own political, social, and economic problems, patiently led the negotiations in 
1994 to 1997, and later in early 2000, which led to the CPA. Kenya was the host 
of the entire CPA peace process. Its former president, Mr. Daniel arap Moi, was 
himself directly and substantially involved, and intervened many times to resolve 
difficult issues. Moreover, Mr. Moi appointed General Lazaro Sumbeiywo as a 
full-time mediator between the Sudanese government and the SPLM.289 
Mediation assistance was also provided by the United States, United Kingdom, 
and Norway, who established what was known as the troika for the peace 
process. Ms. Hilde Johnson attended most of the sessions of the negotiations, and 
she and General Sumbeiywo played a major role in the successful conclusion of 
the CPA. Egypt and Libya also offered their assistance and came out with their 
initiative. Yet, Sudan was not able to utilize that extensive goodwill and effort 
and failed to steer it in the direction of keeping the country united. 
As discussed earlier, the SPLM effectively and craftily utilized the rivalry 
between the government and the opposition to extract from them recognition of 
the right of self-determination. Thus, the SPLM was able to avoid the 
complications of the OAU’s resolution on the intangibility of the African 
borders. Their task was made easier by the competition between the government 
and the opposition to win and woo the SPLM to its side. The SPLM won the 
right of self-determination from the government through an incremental approach 
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involving its splinter groups that eventually returned to the SPLM and used those 
concessions to build the SPLM’s case for self-determination. It followed the 
same approach with the opposition, getting the agreement of each political party 
separately, which made it quite easy for the SPLM to get their joint agreement 
later for self-determination, while at the same time stressing unity for the 
Northern political parties. Mr. John Young observed that “[b]y calling for a 
united Sudan and at the same time giving support to southern self-determination, 
Garang has been able to be all things to all people.”290 
The opposition perceived the agreement to the right of self-determination to 
South Sudan in the larger context of democracy, human rights, and freedoms. 
The opposition leaders led themselves to believe that the idea of the New Sudan 
would prevail, and the Southerners would opt for unity because the North had 
finally recognized their culture and identity. Strangely enough, a number of 
Northern politicians thought recognition of the right of self-determination would 
strengthen the unionist elements within the SPLM. The government thought it 
was splintering the SPLM through strengthening each of its breakaway groups by 
agreeing with them on self-determination. Even when the NCP government 
concluded the CPA, like the Northern opposition groups, they also naively 
thought that the Southerners would opt for unity. This simplistic thinking 
continued during a good part of the interim period, despite the clear signals and 
indications that the South would opt for secession. 
There was also the argument amongst some Northern circles that because of 
the difficulties the Southerners were encountering in governing the South, and 
because of their inter-tribal differences, disputes, and conflicts, they would opt 
for unity.291 Those raising such arguments allowed themselves to forget that those 
same factors are also characteristics of, and prevalent in, the North. But again this 
is the North, always thinking and making decisions on behalf of the 
“uninformed” Southerners. Although it became abundantly clear towards the 
middle of the interim period that the Southerners would opt for secession, there 
was complete denial among the NCP circles and its official media. 
When the dust settled and the results of the referendum became known, with 
close to unanimity in favor of secession, both the government and the opposition 
were stunned. They both suddenly realized their gross failure in detecting the 
secessionist sentiments within the Southern Sudan population. They also realized 
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that they did not do anything to make unity attractive for the Southerners. The 
nagging questions started surfacing: why did they agree to the right of self-
determination instead of federation or even confederation? Immediately 
thereafter, the government and the opposition started blaming each other for 
being the first to endorse the right of self-determination for South Sudan—the 
opposition parties cited the Frankfurt Agreement, while the NCP pointed to the 
Asmara Declaration. It is indeed ironic that the political parties and leaders who 
refused for more than fifty years to consider even granting federation or limited 
regional autonomy to Southern Sudan would agree to a full-fledged self-
determination with the option of secession. It is even more surprising, and indeed 
quite naïve, that with the widespread death and destruction of the civil war in the 
South, the exclusivist policies that the Northern political leaders pursued, and the 
promises they made but never fulfilled (and sometimes did not even intend to 
fulfill), they still expected the Southerners to vote for unity. It should be pointed 
out, however, that just as the South had the option between unity and secession, 
the NCP government had the choice between a unified inclusive Sudan and an 
Arab-Islamic one without the South. Each of them made their choice, and those 
choices, ironically, resulted in the Sudan being the first and only country in the 
world to break up in this century, thus far. 
The story of the splintering of the Sudan is sad, and indeed, a classic case of 
how nations should not deal with their differences, and how they should address 
their religious, linguistic, cultural, and ethnic diversity. It is no doubt a lesson for 
other nations, particularly in Africa, and the Arab world after the Arab Spring of 
2011, and the rise of political Islam there.292 Will Sudan itself learn its own 
lessons with regard to Darfur, the Blue Nile, and South Kordofan, or will the war 
that erupted in the those states escalate, and turn those states into a new and 
another “South Sudan”?293 
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